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"ONE MANNER OF LAW": THE SUPREME
COURT, STARE DECISIS AND THE
IMMIGRATION LAW PLENARY
POWER DOCTRINE
Anne E. Pettit*

Introduction
"Ye shall have one manner of law, as well for the stranger, as for
one of your own country. ...
"Verily he who dooms a worse doom to the friendless and the
comer from afar than to his fellow, injures himself."2
Olga Gonzalez, 33 years old and a single mother, arrived in the
United States from Colombia at the age of six. She became a lawful permanent resident, and except for a brush with the drug laws
in 1987 (facilitating a purchase, a felony for which she served two
years in prison) she has been successful, as most would measure
the term, graduating from college, serving as a secretary to a former mayor of New York, and most recently holding a job as a social worker, helping children. Tragedy intervened, and on May 29,
1996 Gonzalez had to travel to Colombia to bury her mother.
When she returned to the United States after the funeral, immigration inspectors arrested her and jailed her at the Immigration and
Naturalization Service's Varick Street, New York City detention facility, where as of this writing she awaits permanent exile to Colombia, a country she has barely seen in 27 years.
Olga Gonzalez was to have been sworn in as a U.S. citizen on
May 30, 1996. 3
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 1997; B.A., Columbia
University, 1986. The author wishes to thank Prof. Robert J. Kaczorowski for his
comments and suggestions throughout the drafting of this Note.
1. Leviticus 24:22.
2. The Laws of King Cnut, in 1 THORPE'S ANCIENT LAWS AND INSTITUTES OF
ENGLAND 397, quoted in Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 744 (1893)
(Brewer, J., dissenting).
3. Lena Williams, A Law Aimed at Terrorists Hits Legal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES,
July 17, 1996, at Al, B5. See also infra, notes 6-9 and accompanying text (describing
provisions of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), rendering Ms. Gonzalez deportable for her earlier
conviction).
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Inscribed over the entrance to the Supreme Court in Washington, D.C. is the motto "Equal Justice Under Law," a more modern

counterpart to the ancient Levitical imperative and the centuriesold command of the English king, predating even Magna Charta.4
Despite the intervening centuries and millenia, however, the
United States is far from achieving the principle of "one manner of
law" under which the citizen and the immigrant can find equal justice. No matter how far from American constitutional principles
and tradition immigration legislation may be, the Supreme Court
for over a century has deferred to Congress's
determination to
5
doom a worse doom to the comer from afar.
On April 24, 1996, President Clinton signed into law the comprehensive Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

("AEDPA")6 which among other provisions virtually eliminates
the possibility of political asylum for refugees without proper travel
documents7 and renders deportable practically any alien (including
lawful permanent residents) convicted of a felony, no matter how
long ago the conviction occurred. 8 AEDPA also strips most aliens
deemed excludable from the United States of the right to meaning4. Cnut, or Canute, ruled England from 1016 to 1035. AMERICAN HERITAGE
1418 (2d College ed. 1991). King John signed Magna Charta on June 15,
1215. Id. at 754.
5. One court described statutory provisions for the exclusion of various groups
from the United States as "a magic mirror, reflecting the fears and concerns of past
Congresses." Lennon v. INS, 527 F.2d 187, 189 (2d Cir. 1975). See also Peter H.
Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1984)
("Throughout our history, [immigration law's] changing character has reflected more
fundamental social and ideological structures.").
6. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (1996) (hereinafter "AEDPA"). See generally Alison Mitchell, Clinton
Signs Measure on Terrorism and Death Penalty Appeals, N.Y. TIMEs, April 25, 1996,
at A18.
7. AEDPA § 422, 110 Stat. at 1270-71 (amending Immigration and Nationality
Act (hereinafter "INA") § 235, 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (1994)). See also Eric Schmitt, Provision in Terrorism Bill Cuts Rights of Illegal Aliens, N.Y. TIMES, April 19, 1996 at B9
(highlighting provisions of AEDPA affecting aliens both already within the United
States and seeking to enter the country).
Throughout this Note, the Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66
Stat. 163 (1952), or "INA," as amended,-is cited both by the Act's original section
numbers and to Title 8 of the U.S. Code. Immigration practitioners, the Immigration
and Naturalization Service ("INS"), and other agencies with jurisdiction over immigration matters almost always use the original section numbering, which is also tied to
the section numbering of Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations, which codifies
the INA's implementing regulations, and to many every-day usages in the immigration field.
8. AEDPA § 440(c), 110 Stat. at 1277 (amending INA § 242, 8 U.S.C. § 1252
(1994)).
DiCrIONARY
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ful habeas corpus review of that determination 9 -a

right the

century. 10

Supreme Court has recognized for over a
On August 22, 1996, President Clinton signed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996."
Enacted in part because of congressional belief that immigrants
come2 to the United States (legally or illegally) to get welfare benefits,' the law eliminated almost all benefits, including food stamps

and Supplemental Security. Income, 13 for aliens, including elderly
and disabled legal immigrants of many years' residence in the
United States.' 4 Finally, just before adjourning, the 104th Congress
passed, and President Clinton signed, a major immigration reform
9. AEDPA § 423, 110 Stat. at 1272. This section provides that no court shall have
jurisdiction to review any individual claim under § 422's expedited exclusion determinations, strips the federal courts of jurisdiction to entertain petitions for declaratory,
injunctive or any.other equitable relief, and forbids the certification of any class under
FED. R. Civ. P. Rule 23. "Rump" habeas proceedings will be available, the only allowable issues being whether the petitioner is an alien (provided the petitioner makes
a non-frivolous claim to U.S. nationality); whether the petitioner was ordered excluded under the new' law (which is, of course, the reason for the petition in the first
place, but which conceivably could catch some fatal procedural error); and whether
the petitioner is a lawful permanent resident, should s/he make that claim. The only
allowable relief is a hearing, and all collateral attacks on the exclusion determination
are barred.
10. The Supreme Court has recognized the right of any alien restrained of liberty
(whether physically detained, released on bond, or granted parole to remain in the
United States pending a hearing) to seek review in habeas corpus proceedings since
its earliest rulings on immigration statutes. See, e.g., The Chinese Exclusion Case
(Chae Chan Ping v. United States), 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (reviewing habeas corpus
proceedings). See also Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892)
("[A]n alien immigrant, prevented from landing by any.., officer claiming authority
to do so under an act of Congress, and thereby restrained of his liberty, is doubtless
entitled to a writ of habeas corpus to ascertain whether the restraint is lawful.").
11. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
12. See Charles Wheeler & Josh Bernstein, Welfare Bill Impacts Immigrants Hard-

est, BENDER'S

IMMIGRATION BULLETIN,

September 1996, at 3. Benefits to immigrants

accounted for about 44% ($23.7 billion over six years) of the law's anticipated savings;
however, only about 5% of all immigrants actually receive welfare although 9% of the
U.S. population are non-citizens. Id. at 3-4.
13. Congressional Budget Office estimates indicate that some 500,000 legal immigrants will lose SSI benefits and that almost 1,000,000 will lose food stamps. Charles
Wheeler, The New Alien Restrictions on Public Benefits: The Full Impact Remains

Uncertain, 73

INTERPRETER RELEASES

1245, 1248 (Sept. 23, 1996), citing Congres-

sional Budget Office, Federal Budgetary Implications.of H.R. 3734, The PersonalResponsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Aug. 9, 1996, at 14, 15.
14. Approximately half of the legal aliens who will lose SSI benefits have been in
the United States for ten years or longer. Wheeler, supra note 13, at 1248. In addition, the states may bar legal immigrants from receiving non-emergency Medicaid
benefits and newly created block grant programs, a move which may actually cost
them more in the long run, for example because many treatable health problems will
degenerate into serious, and expensive, emergencies. Id. at 1248-50.
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provisions posing extremely serious conbill' 5 which also contains
16
stitutional questions.
Immigration and civil liberties advocates will surely seek to chal-

lenge provisions of these bills in the federal courts. Since its earliest rulings on immigration matters, however, the Supreme Court
has held that the Constitution does not restrain Congress's power

to regulate immigration. 17 The Court has found Congress's power

15. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 [hereinafter IIRIRA], Pub. L. No. 104-208, 142 CONG. REC. H11787-H11833 (daily ed.
Sept. 28, 1996). President Clinton signed the bill on September 30, 1996, as part of a
fiscal 1997 budget bill. President Signs Immigration Overhaul Measure, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES

1317 (Oct. 7, 1996).

16. Provisions of IIRIRA of particular concern to immigration law commentators
and practitioners include §§ 301-309 (amending scattered sections of Tit. 8 U.S.C.),
142 CONG. REC. at H11795-808 (creating a new alien "removal" procedure with simplified process, including a summary exclusion procedure, and reduced substantive
review possibilities); sec. 348, § 212(h) (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)), 142 CONG.
REC. at H11811 (creating almost mandatory deportation for lawful permanent residents convicted of almost any felony and stripping the federal courts of review power
over waiver of deportation decisions); sec. 377, § 245 A(f)(4) (amending 8 U.S.C.
§ 1255a(f)(4)), 142 CONG. REC. at H1184 (stripping federal court jurisdiction over
certain types of class action suits), sec. 381, § 279 (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1329), id.,
("clarifying" that federal district courts have jurisdiction over all causes of action arising under the Immigration and Nationality Act, but only if brought by the U.S. government); §§ 401-405, 142 CONG. REC. at H11816-18 (establishing pilot programs to
verify employee identity and work eligibility through INS databases); secs. 551-553,
§ 213A (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 213A and 1631), 142 CONG. REC. at H11821-22
(substantially tightening income and other requirements for aliens and U.S. citizens
wishing to sponsor relatives for immigration, and making affidavits of support legally
enforceable), and § 642, 142 CONG. REC. at H11829 (barring any state or local entity
from prohibiting its employees from reporting aliens unlawfully present in the United
States).
The "court-stripping" sections of IIRIRA, §§ 377 and 381, may in the final analysis
be its most constitutionally dangerous provisions, and have drawn significant comment in the national press for such a seemingly arcane jurisdictional topic. See, e.g.,
David Johnston, Government Is Quickly Using Power of New Immigration Law, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 21, 1996, at A20 (noting government motions to dismiss a number of
class-action lawsuits, even suits unrelated to the actions supposedly targeted by
IIRIRA); Anthony Lewis, Running From the Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1996, at A17
(noting the proliferation of court-stripping statutes, including IIRIRA, signed into law
by President Clinton, when even at the height of the 1950s Red Scare Congress failed
to pass such measures); Anthony Lewis, Clinton's Sorriest Record N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
14, 1996, at A17 (describing consequences of legislation, including several cases which
stand to be dismissed after IIRIRA); Patrick J. McDonnell, New Law Could End
Immigrants' Amnesty Hopes, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1996, at Al (noting, inter alia, a
letter from 90 law professors urging Congress to reject the court-stripping proposals
as a threat to "[t]he most basic safeguards of due process").
17. E.g., Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896); Lem Moon Sing v.
United States, 158 U.S. 538 (1895); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698
(1893); The Chinese Exclusion Case (Chae Chan Ping v. United States), 130 U.S. 581
(1889). Two cases involving Japanese immigrants ordered excluded as likely to be-
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to be both plenary, i.e., completely the subject of legislative prerogative, as are Congress's constitutionally enumerated powers,'18 and

extraconstitutionalin origin, requiring extreme deference from the
Court. 19 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that it cannot
substantively review the constitutionality of immigration statutes
because they implicate foreign affairs.20

This jurisprudential outlook is unique. In no other legislative
area has the Supreme Court shown so much deference to Congress
or permitted Congress such freedom from constitutional re-

straints.2 ' It is also self-contradictory, for a truly plenary power of
come public charges also contributed significantly to this phase of "plenary power"
doctrinal development. The Japanese Immigrant Case (Yamataya v. Fisher), 189 U.S.
86 (1903); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892). For a discussion of
cases developing the judicial power to review legislative acts, see infra, note 27. See
also infra, notes 21, 23-24 and accompanying text (describing how the Supreme
Court's view of Congress's plenary powers in other constitutionally enumerated areas
has evolved toward placing greater constitutional limits on such powers).
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Congress generally has plenary power to legislate in
constitutionally enumerated areas. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197
(1824). Under this traditional view, Congress's plenary powers are complete in themselves, may be exercised to their fullest extent, and are unlimited, except by the Constitution itself. Id. See also United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1627 (1995)
(stating the Court's current understanding of Congress's plenary power over interstate commerce).
The "plenary" powers include the ability to legislate in areas implied by the enumerated powers as well. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 386 (1819).
The unique features of the plenary power over immigration are its status as an extraconstitutional "inherent" power and the Court's reluctance to apply constitutional
norms and restrictions to Congress's exercise of the power except on grounds of constitutionally mandated procedure. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954-55 (1983) (former § 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, providing for a House of
Representatives legislative veto, violates bicameralism and presentment requirements, U.S. CONST., art. I, §§ 1, 7).
19. See infra part I.B (reviewing the origins and evolution of the Court-created
"immigration plenary power doctrine").
20. See generally infra part II for a history of these doctrinal developments.
21. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 116 U.S. 1114, 1123 (1996) (overruling Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), and holding that Congress
cannot abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from private suits in the federal courts by deeming state consent to suit through the Commerce Clause, U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3); United States v. Lopez, 115 U.S. 1624, 1630-31 (1995) (invalidating gun-free school zone legislation as having "nothing to do with 'commerce' or
any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms");
Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 58 (1958) (limiting exercise of the power to regulate
foreign affairs) ("Broad as the power in the National Government to regulate foreign
affairs must necessarily be, it is not without limitation. The restrictions confining
Congress in the exercise of any of the powers expressly delegated to it in the Constitution apply with equal vigor when that body seeks to regulate our relations with other
nations."); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (limiting power to regulate the armed
forces and holding all of Congress's powers limited by the Bill of Rights). But see INS
v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (invalidating legislative veto provision, Immigration
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legislation would be beyond the Supreme Court's power of review
completely, an idea the Supreme Court adopts or ignores seem-

ingly at its own pleasure, referring to it when in effect upholding
immigration legislation and resting on constitutional provisions,

notably the Due Process Clause, 2 when it wishes to intervene.23
Immigration law practitioners and constitutional commentators re-

fer to the Court's general principle of extreme judicial restraint in
immigration law matters as the "plenary power doctrine. "24
and Nationality Act ("INA") § 244(c)(2), former 8 U.S.C. 1254(c)(2), repealed by Immigration Technical Corrections Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-525, § 2(q), 101 Stat.
2609, 2613 (1988), and stating in dicta that even plenary authority to regulate immigration has some limit). In context, this statement fairly implicates only the separation
of powers doctrine, which the legislative veto provision trenched upon.
Commerce, the war power and foreign policy are the areas in which Congress historically has exercised its power to legislate to the fullest possible extent. See, e.g.,
United States v.' Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (foreign affairs);
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (commerce). These are leading cases
in which the Supreme Court expressed great deference to Congress's determinations
in these areas. In later years, the Court became much less deferential. See Perez, 356
U.S. at 58 (foreign affairs) and Seminole Tribe, 116 U.S. at 1123 (commerce); cf.
Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909) ("[O]ver no
conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over
that with which the act we are now considering deals," i.e., the power to regulate the
entry of aliens into the United States.). The Court cited Oceanic Steam Navigation
Co. with approval as recently as 1993, and has never backed away from the sweeping
pronouncement quoted above. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 305 (1993), citing
Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977), quoting Oceanic Steam Navigation, Co., 214
U.S. at 339.
22. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
23. A "plenary" power is full and complete in itself, uncheckable by any other
power. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977), quoting Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909), discussed supra note 21. Furthermore, the Court's jurisdictional power is limited to cases and controversies arising
under the Constitution, laws of the United States and treaties of the United States,
U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, and laws of the United States must accord with the Constitution's provisions. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803); see infra note 27 (discussing judicial review). Yet, as the large body of case law cited in this
Note indicates, the Supreme Court does in fact exercise its power of review over immigration legislation, and the degree of deference which it accords to Congress appears to vary with the result reached. See generally Brian K. Bates and Bruce A.
Hake, A Tale of Two Cites: Due Process and the Plenary Power Doctrine, 90-04 IMMIGRATION BRIEFINGS (April 1992) (comparing lines of cases giving almost complete
deference to Congress on one hand with cases upholding procedural due process
rights of aliens on the other); see also Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a
Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990) [hereinafter Phantom Norms] (discussing the use of
procedural safeguards in immigration proceedings as a substitute for recognizing substantive constitutional rights).
24. Compare supra note 18, describing Congress's power to legislate in constitutionally enumerated areas. For the sake of clarity, immigration law's special variant
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The Supreme Court's deference to Congress in immigration regulation springs from century-old holdings which the Court consistently refuses to reevaluate, citing considerations of stare decisis.2 5
Recently, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.

Casey,2 6 the Court explained in great detail its practical and prudential considerations in evaluating its precedents. The Casey

"joint opinion" and dissents laid bare these considerations, in perhaps the most penetrating analysis of the Supreme Court jurisprudential process since the early opinions of Chief Justice John
Marshall and Justice Joseph Story.27
of plenary power is referred to hereinafter as the "immigration plenary power doctrine." See infra, part II for a history of the doctrine's development and effects.
25. In chronological order, the seminal immigration plenary power cases include
The Chinese Exclusion Case (Chae Chan Ping v. United States), 130 U.S. 581 (1889);
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892); Fong Yue Ting v. United States,
149 U.S. 698 (1893); Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538 (1895); Wong
Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896); The Japanese Immigrant Case (Yamataya
v. Fisher), 189 U.S. 86 (1903); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S.
537 (1950); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342
U.S. 580 (1952); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953);
Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954); Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958);
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977); Jean v.
Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985); and Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993).
26. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Casey arose as a constitutional challenge to a Pennsylvania abortion statute requiring, inter alia, a 24-hour waiting period before a woman could obtain an abortion; spousal notification before a married woman could
obtain an abortion; parental permission for a minor to do so; and that physicians
provide certain detailed information about the abortion procedure before an abortion
could be performed. Id. at 879-901 (analyzing statutory provisions). The Court upheld all but the spousal notification provision. Id. at 901. In doing so, the Court
reaffirmed the central proposition of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that a
woman has a constitutional right stemming from the Fourteenth Amendment to terminate her pregnancy before fetal viability), Casey, 505 U.S. at 871, but held that
since the state has an "important and legitimate interest in potential life," id. (citing
Roe, 410 U.S. at 163), it may regulate abortion from the moment of conception. Id. at
869. Such regulation cannot impose an "undue burden" on the woman's constitutional right to an abortion before the fetus becomes viable. Id. at 872.
Roe had promulgated a "trimester" framework for abortion regulation during the
first three months of pregnancy, virtually no special regulation of abortion was permissible; during the second three months, regulations reasonably related to preserving
maternal health were permissible; and during the last three months of pregnancy
(which at the time of Roe approximated fetal viability), the state could extensively
regulate or even proscribe abortion in the interest of potential life, except when the
mother's life or health was at stake. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65; see also Casey, 505 U.S.
at 872. Casey rejected the trimester scheme in favor of the "undue burden" test. 505
U.S. at 873. This holding effectively guts Roe, however, as the only abortion regulation imposing an "undue burden" is one that "strike[s]at the right itself," i.e., seeks to
ban abortion for a class of women. Id. at 874 (emphasis supplied).
27. The groundbreaking cases establishing and developing the power and limitations of judicial review of legislative acts include Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.) ("an act of the legislature, repugnant to the
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This Note argues that the Casey analysis of stare decisis, precedent and the rule of law provides a strikingly effective paradigm
through which to view the history of Supreme Court immigration
rulings. Viewed through the Court's own analysis of its power to
make and revise precedent decisions, the immigration plenary
power doctrine's jurisprudential shortcomings become more evident and the arguments to overturn the doctrine become more
powerful. Part I of this Note briefly sketches the history and development of the immigration plenary power doctrine. Part II examines the constitutional problems and anomalies of the doctrine and
outlines the importance of stare decisis principles in perpetuating
it. Part III discusses the constitutional and jurisprudential framework for stare decisis considerations in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey and applies this framework to

the immigration law plenary power doctrine. This Note concludes
that no principled constitutional or prudential consideration upholds the Supreme Court's extraordinarily deferential approach to
immigration legislation. It further concludes that the Court should
review immigration legislation by the same standards it applies to
any other act of Congress.
I. History and Development of the Immigration Plenary
Power Doctrine

The U.S. Constitution is practically silent on questions of immigration. Although the Naturalization Clause delegates the power
to establish "a uniform rule of naturalization" to Congress, 8 the
Supreme Court has never rested solely upon the clause to give
broader authority to Congress to regulate the entry and terms of
stay of aliens. 29 The Importation of Persons Clause in Article I of
constitution, is void"); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816)
(Story, J.) (extending the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction to constitutional decisions of state courts); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819)
(Marshall, C.J.) (clarifying that if Congress should legislate outside its enumerated
powers, the Court must declare the act void, but where the Constitution does not

prohibit such lawmaking and the act is "really calculated to effect any of the objects
entrusted to the government" by enumerated power, the Court will not inquire into
the degree of the law's necessity, as this would violate the separation of powers).
28. U.S. CONsT. art I, § 8, cl. 4.
29. See, e.g., DAVID A. MARTIN, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MAJOR ISSUES IN
IMMIGRATION LAW, 1987 WL 123658 at *7 (1987). But see INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.

919, 952 (1983) (referring in passing to Congress's "purporting to exercise power defined in Art. I, § 8, cl. 4 to 'establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization"' while actually altering the legal rights, duties and relations of officials outside the legislative
branch by including a legislative veto provision which the Court then declared unconstitutional). See also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225 (1982) (describing power of
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the Constitution3 ° was a euphemism for the slave trade, and the
Court never sought to apply this provision to the immigration of

free persons.3 1 The Court briefly rested the power in the Commerce Clause,3" but it did not fit comfortably into that framework
either.
Instead, in a 100-year-old series of cases, the Supreme Court developed the immigration plenary power doctrine as a largely ex-

traconstitutional theory of federal legislative authority over

immigration.33 The Court found this power to be a necessary and
inherent attribute of sovereignty. 34 Furthermore, because it considered the power to regulate immigration to be related to the war

power35 as a matter of foreign affairs,36 the Court held itself largely
without power to review immigration legislation.37
The Supreme Court has clearly stated that Congress may not au-

thorize a violation of the Constitution.38 Nonetheless, Congress
regularly passes-and the Court upholds-immigration legislation
39
that would be unconstitutional if applied directly to U.S. citizens.
Congress as deriving from a combination of the Naturalization Clause, "its plenary
authority with respect to foreign relations and international commerce, and upon the
inherent power of a sovereign to close its borders").
30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
31. Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of
Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 856 (1987) [hereinafter A
Century of Chinese Exclusion].
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See The Head Money Cases (Edye v. Robertson),
112 U.S. 580 (1884) (defining the power to regulate immigration as an aspect of foreign commerce).
33. See infra, part II.A, for an account of the evolution of the Court's theory of
inherent plenary power in Congress to regulate immigration.
34. E.g., The Chinese Exclusion Case (Chae Chan Ping v. United States), 130 U.S.
581, 607 (1889) (finding power to exclude and expel aliens so clearly within "essential
attributes of sovereignty" that the proposition cannot be seriously contested).
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
36. See Stephen H. Legomsky, ImmigrationLaw and the Principleof Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 Sup. C-r. REV. 255, 261-69; see also infra notes 144-55 and
accompanying text (describing the effect on immigration law of the "political question" doctrine, which the Court often applies to foreign affairs matters to preclude
judicial review). See generally Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976) (describing and criticizing application of the doctrine
to various legal areas, including foreign affairs).
37. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 606 (Congress's finding that presence
of "foreigners of a different race" is "dangerous to ... peace and security" is conclu-

sive upon the judiciary.).
38. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973).
39. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-16, at 358 (2d ed.
1988). See also Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79 (1976) (upholding statute requiring
participants in a federal medical insurance program to be either citizens or permanent
resident aliens with five years of continuous residence in the U.S.). A similar statute
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These immigration laws do in fact impinge on citizens' constitutional rights, especially on the First Amendment areas of marriage
and intimate association,40 freedom of religion, 1 freedom of
speech and political association. 42 Additionally, some immigration
statutory provisions interfere with the citizen's right to equal pro-

tection of the laws through the Fifth Amendment's due process liberty interest. 3 Immigration enforcement statutes may also
interfere with the Fourth Amendment right to freedom from un-

requiring that a citizen reside for five years in a particular state to obtain a government benefit would immediately run afoul of the 14th Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969) (one-year waiting
period for new arrivals to receive welfare benefits "constitutes an invidious discrimination denying them equal protection of the laws") (footnotes omitted). Shapiro directly implicated the federal power to make such regulations, as Congress had
imposed a residence requirement on the District of Columbia and had authorized the
states to do the same. Id. at 641.
40. See, e.g., United States ex reL Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 548 (1950)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (War Brides Act, exempting servicemen's foreign brides
from immigration law provisions that would normally exclude them from the United
States, was "a bounty afforded by Congress not to the alien who had become the wife
of an American but to the citizen who had honorably served his country"); id. at 55152 (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("Congress will have to use more explicit language than
any yet cited before I will agree that it has authorized an administrative officer to
break up the family of an American citizen or force him to keep his wife by becoming
an exile").
41. See, e.g., American Friends Serv. Comm. v. Thornburgh, 961 F.2d 1405 (9th
Cir. 1991); Intercommunity Ctr. for Justice and Peace v. INS, 910 F.2d 42 (2d Cir.
1990) (holding in both cases that enforcing ban on employing undocumented workers
against religious organizations does not violate the First Amendment right to free
exercise of religion). Other cases involved the "sanctuary" movement of the 1980s
which brought Central American refugees into the United States and sheltered them,
often in churches. See, e.g., United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991) (consolidating on appeal and upholding eight convictions of sanctuary movement defendants for "alien smuggling"); United States v.
Merkt, 764 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1985) (Merkt I), reaffd on other grounds, 794 F.2d 950
(5th Cir. 1986) (Merkt H) and cert. denied, 480 U.S. 946 (1987) (comparable alien
smuggling charges).
42. E.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522
(1954); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S.
524 (1952). See infra notes 96-105 and accompanying text for further discussion.
43. E.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (non-marital children and their fathers
excluded from mutual immigration benefits while such children and their mothers are
not). For a long list of Supreme Court cases requiring that gender-based classifications outside the immigration area must "'serve important governmental objectives
and.., be substantially related to achievements of those objectives,' "see id. at 809-10
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing among many others Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976)).
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right
reasonable searches and seizures44 and the Fifth Amendment
45
law.
of
process
due
substantive
and
to procedural
The historical circumstances of immigration legislation and the
Supreme Court's promulgation of the abstentionist immigration
plenary power doctrine explain this contradiction in part. In
America's early days, Congress, insofar as it considered the question at all, believed that immigration was a natural right inherent in
the peoples of the world. 6 However, as ever larger numbers of
immigrants arrived on American shores after the Civil War, calls
for immigration regulation increased as well.47 In 1875 Congress
passed the first law excluding classes of aliens-prostitutes and
44. See, e.g., Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960) (in espionage investigation, use of administrative INS warrant to gain entry to suspected illegal alien's premises permissible although no probable cause existed to support issuance of a
magistrate's warrant and criminal prosecution, not immigration enforcement,. was the
main purpose of the raid). In the border enforcement context, U.S. citizens of Hispanic origin may suffer enhanced scrutiny from Border Patrol officers who perceive
them as foreigners. See Murillo v. Musegades, 809 F. Supp. 487 (W.D. Tex. 1992)
(enjoining INS Border Patrol from stopping, questioning, searching and in some cases
arresting faculty, staff and students of a high school located next to the border in El
Paso, Texas); Mendoza v. INS, 559 F. Supp. 842 (W.D. Tex. 1982) (enjoining INS from
conducting warrantless raids on El Paso bars). Absent specific articulated facts and
away from the border or its functional equivalent (i.e., a fixed checkpoint), such race
and nationality based inquiries are unconstitutional. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975).
45. See, e.g., United States ex reL Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) (upholding summary exclusion from the United States of U.S. citizen's foreign-born
wife). In his biting dissent, Justice Jackson remarked:
Now this American citizen is told he cannot bring his wife to the United
States, but he will not be told why.... So he went to court and sought a writ
of habeas corpus, which we never tire of citing to Europe as the unanswerable evidence that our free country permits no arbitrary official detention.
And the Government tells the Court that not even a court can find out why
The menace to the security of this country... is as
the girl is excluded ....
nothing compared to the menace to free institutions inherent in procedures
of this pattern.
Id. at 551 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Justice Jackson knew whereof he spoke, having
served as chief United States prosecutor at the Nuremburg war crimes trials in 1945.
EUGENE C. GERHART, AMERICA'S ADVOCATE: ROBERT H. JACKSON 307-406 (1958)
(describing Justice Jackson's role at Nuremburg as both an organizer of the tribunal
and a lead prosecutor).
46. For example, Congress declared in 1868 that "the right of expatriation is a
[I]n recognition of this principle this
natural and inherent right of all people ....
government has freely received emigrants from all nations, and invested them with
the rights of citizenship ... ." Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 249, 15 Stat. 223 (1868), quoted
in Henkin, A Century of Chinese Exclusion, supra note 31, at 855 n.10.
47. The Chinese Exclusion Case (Chae Chan Ping v. United States), 130 U.S. 581,
593-99 (1889) (discussing history of Chinese immigration and of the laws passed to
limit it). See also Henkin, A Century of Chinese Exclusion, supra note 31, at 855-56
(discussing socioeconomic factors underlying immigration legislation).
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convicts-from the United States.48 As economic depression deepened and unemployment mounted in the 1870s, representatives, in
particular from California, argued that immigrants undesirably
competed economically with American citizens.49 In response to
complaints that Chinese laborers, encouraged by treaty 50 to settle
in California in more prosperous times, were taking white men's

jobs, 5 Congress restricted and in 1892 halted further immigration
from China to the United States.52
In 1889, the Supreme Court in The Chinese Exclusion Case53 upheld these laws. Without basing its holding on the Constitution's
enumerated powers, the Court found that Congress had the inherent power to regulate immigration,54 and specifically the power to
exclude any particular class of aliens from the United States.55 Ad-

ditionally, Congress could derogate from international agreements,
in this case the Burlingame Treaty with China,56 in the exercise of
any of its powers.57
48. Henkin, A Century of Chinese Exclusion, supra note 31, at 855-56; Act of
March 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477.
49. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 593-99.
50. Presidential Proclamation of July 28, 1868, 16 Stat. 739-41 (amending Treaty
between the United States and China of June 18, 1858).
51. Henkin, A Century of Chinese Exclusion, supra note 31, at 855-56.
52. Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58; Act of July 5, 1884, ch. 220, 23 Stat.
115; Act of October 1, 1888, ch. 1064, 25 Stat. 504 (providing, respectively, for exclusion for a ten-year period of new Chinese immigrants and registration of those present in U.S.; establishing certificates of residence as the only evidence by which
resident Chinese could re-enter the U.S.; and invalidating all certificates of Chinese
residents absent from the U.S. on or after date of passage, thus prohibiting their reentry). The Act of May 6, 1882 was the first congressional restriction on voluntary Chinese immigration, prior acts having addressed only the importation of indentured
Chinese laborers. Henkin, A Century of Chinese Exclusion, supra note 31, at 856 n.
12. The Act of October 1, 1888 was the subject of The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130
U.S. 581, in which the Supreme Court first considered Congress's authority to pass
such legislation at all. The Act of May 5, 1892, ch. 60, 27 Stat. 25, continued the 1882
Act's suspension of Chinese immigration and provided, for the first time, for deportation of Chinese persons found unlawfully present in the U.S. Henkin, A Century of
Chinese Exclusion, supra note 31, at 856 n. 12.
53. 130 U.S. 581.
54. Id. at 606-07.
55. Id. at 608.
56. Treaty of Peace, Amity and Commerce, between the United States of America
and China, 12 Stat. 1023 (1858), as amended by Additional Articles to the Treaty
between the United States and China, 16 Stat. 739 (1868).
57. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 600. Treaties are on an equal footing
with the Constitution and laws enacted in pursuance of the Constitution as the
supreme law of the land. Id.; U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. See also Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 194 (1888) (treaties and acts of Congress carry equal obligations and
effect). The Court in The Chinese Exclusion Case viewed treaties as executory contracts, requiring legislation for their "performance," and only rarely as operating by
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On one hand, the Chinese Exclusion Court noted that the constitutionally enumerated powers of Congress to declare war,58 make
treaties, 59 suppress insurrection, 60 repel invasion, 61 regulate foreign

commerce, 62 secure a republican form of government to the
states,63 and admit subjects of other nations to citizenship 4 were
"sovereign powers, restricted in their exercise only by the
[Clonstitution itself and considerations of public policy and justice
' '65
which control, more or less, the conduct of all civilized nations.

On the other hand, the Court found, the power to regulate immigration originated outside the Constitution and escaped such constitutional restriction altogether.66 Thus, the power to regulate
immigration gained a special extraconstitutionalstanding which it

has retained, with relatively few modifications, to the present

day. 67

their own force and thus directly effective as legislative acts. If Congress must pass
implementing legislation, Congress could equally pass legislation to derogate from a
treaty, and Congress's act last in time would become the effective law. 130 U.S. at
600.
58. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
59. Id., art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (President has power to conclude treaties "by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate. .
60. Id., art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
61. Id.
62. Id., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
63. U.S. CoNST., art. IV, § 4.
64. Id., art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
65. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 604 (emphasis supplied).
66. Id. at 603 (finding that the power to exclude aliens from its territory is necessary to any independent nation).
67. Commentators differ over the Constitution's role in The Chinese Exclusion
Case. In one view, The Chinese Exclusion Case severed immigration regulating authority from the enumerated powers by invoking "sovereignty." Legomsky, supra
note 36, at 274. By contrast, Hiroshi Motomura considers that the Court did focus on
the expanse of the federal government's power under the Constitution, at least in
contradistinction to whether individual rights might set any limits on that power, a
proposition the Court would not reach for many years and in other contexts. Phantom Norms, supra note 23, at 551. Another authority finds that the proposition that
Congress has a power to regulate immigration which is not rooted in constitutional
provisions is not a particularly radical one, but that the later accretions to that proposition, such as the idea that immigration legislation is not subject to the constitutional
controls governing other legislation (a proposition which the originating Chinese Exclusion Case did not even stand for), "cry out for the sharpest criticism." Henkin, A
Century of Chinese Exclusion, supra note 31, at 858. Another approach to the problem is that the Court did conduct a constitutional analysis, but did so through the lens
of the conduct of foreign affairs rather than making an inquiry into how the immigration regulating power might be inferred from the text or structure of the Constitution.
T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens and the Constitution, 83 AM. J.
INT'L LAW 862, 863 (1989). Aleinikoff noted Justice Field's comparison of the need to
regulate immigration to the need to defend against invading armies, and Field's evocative reference to the "vast hordes ...crowding in upon us." Id.; The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 606. Perhaps it is simplest to view The Chinese Exclusion Case
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Three years after its Chinese Exclusion ruling, the Supreme
Court in Nishimura Ekiu v. United States68 strengthened Congress's
power to regulate immigration, affirming that Congress could dele-

gate to executive branch officers the immediate authority to exclude an alien from the United States.69 Finally, the Court held

that the executive officer's decision alone was due process of law
for an alien seeking entry into the United States.7"
Other Supreme Court decisions in this early period held constitutional the deportation of aliens who had entered the United

States, no matter how long their period of U.S. residence. 71 This
deportation power matched the power to exclude aliens from initial entry, because entry into the United States and permission to
remain were both matters of the sovereign's pure permission.72
Thus, even longtime resident aliens reentering the United States
and its progeny as examples of result-oriented jurisprudence rather than as principled
attempts to locate and construct the immigration power in terms of the Constitution.
68. 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892). Nishimura Ekiu was a Japanese immigrant denied
entry to the United States on grounds that she could become a "public charge," that
is, that she would be unable to support herself.
69. Id. At first, these executive officers were from the Treasury Department. At
present, the Department of Justice's Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) is
primarily responsible for immigration enforcement.
70. Nishimura Ekiu, 142 U.S. at 660 ("It is not within the province of the judiciary
to order that foreigners ... be permitted to enter, in opposition to the constitutional

and lawful measures of the legislative and executive branches of the national government. As to such persons, the decisions of executive or administrative officers, acting
within powers expressly conferred by Congress, are due process of law."), citing Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855).
The Murray Court, however, specifically examined whether in fact the process provided for in the distress warrant property seizure provision at issue comported with
the rest of the Constitution and with "settled usages and modes of proceeding" which
the United States had received from England. 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 276-77. The
Nishimura Ekiu Court did not make such an examination, focusing instead on the
constitutional appointment power. 142 U.S. at 663.
Before President Clinton signed the Anti-Terrorism and Effective. Death Penalty
Act into law on April 24, 1996, aliens in Nishimura Ekiu's position were statutorily
entitled to a hearing before an immigration judge and federal habeas review of their
eligibility to enter the United States. INA § 106, 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(b). Under the
AEDPA, certain aliens (e.g., those forced to flee their homelands with false papers
and whom a low-level inspector feels cannot state a claim of persecution, see supra
note 7) will be entitled to even less process than Nishimura Ekiu-she had the right to
appeal an adverse decision of the port inspector first to the Superintendent of Immigration and then to the Secretary of the Treasury. 142 U.S. at 662-63.
71. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893). See also The Japanese
Immigrant Case (Yamataya v. Fisher), 189 U.S. 86, 99 (1903) (discussing due process
in context of deportation authority); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896)
(upholding power to deport but striking down imposition of a sentence of imprisonment for a term absent a full judicial hearing).
72. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 707-08.
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from travel abroad faced the same legal barrier as new arrivals: a
federal official could forbid them to enter the United States, no
matter how strong their ties to their adopted homeland.73
The Supreme Court in Wong Wing v. United States74 found that
the Constitution did impose some limits on Congress's power to

regulate immigration. Analogizing to its Fourteenth Amendment

holding in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,75 the Court held that the Fifth and
77

Sixth Amendments 76 applied to aliens within the United States.
Any alien in detention for exclusion or deportation could invoke
the writ of habeas corpus to seek review of the propriety of that
detention.

In fact, the Court held in Fong Yue Ting v. United

States79 that aside from questions of their entry and expulsion,
aliens within the United States enjoyed the same constitutional

protections as citizens. 80 On this ground, the Court held unconstititutional a federal provision authorizing executive officers to im-

pose a term of hard labor upon illegally present Chinese
immigrants, 81 finding that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments permitted such a punishment only after a full judicial trial.8"

Despite these modest constitutional protections within the
United States, aliens in general remained subject to Congress's discretionary decisions to exclude or expel them. 83 Resident aliens

possessed only modest constitutional protection of their ability to
remain in the United States, for the Supreme Court held in 1893 in
Fong Yue Ting that deportation, harsh as it might be in a given
case, is not a "punishment" to which Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and
73. Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538, 547 (1895) (holding that a
Chinese merchant permanently domiciled in San Francisco who temporarily traveled
abroad before exclusion act went into effect may be excluded upon his return).
74. 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (Congress may not impose a sentence of hard labor upon
aliens illegally present in the United States unless after a trial by jury).
75. 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (Fourteenth Amendment reference to "persons" is
not confined to citizens).
76. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V ("No person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law."); id., amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury.").
77. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896).
78. Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892).
79. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
80. Id at 724 ("Chinese laborers ...

like all other aliens residing in the United

States ... are entitled, so long as they are permitted by the government of the United
States to remain in the country, to the safeguards of the Constitution, and to the
protection of the laws, in regard to their rights of person and of property, and to their
civil and criminal responsibility.").
81. Act of May 5, 1892, ch. 60, § 4, 27 Stat. 25.
82. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896).
83. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 724.
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Eighth Amendment protections apply. 84 An alien who has entered
the United States must have due process notice and opportunity to
85
be heard, but that is all the process that the Constitution requires.
The Court in The Japanese Immigrant Case limited even this protection; if the deportee could not understand English, and thus the

substance of the proceeding against her, that was her misfortune.86
The Cold War era provided the Supreme Court with yet another
justification for its immigration law plenary power doctrine--the
need to protect the United States' national security interests.87 The
case law of this era shows extreme Court deference to the govern-

ment at the expense of both aliens and citizens. The Immigration
and Nationality Act of 195288 and other legislation of the period

9

84. Id. at 730.
85. The JapaneseImmigrant Case (Yamataya v. Fisher), 189 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1903).
86. Id. at 102. See INA § 242(b)(1) and (3), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(b)(1) and (3) (providing for notice reasonable under the circumstances and a reasonable opportunity to
examine the opposing evidence, present evidence, and cross-examine witnesses, all of
which clearly imply the ability to understand the proceedings). See also 8 C.F.R.
§ 235.6(a) (providing that an interpreter shall explain notices of hearings to detained
aliens if necessary). While statutory requirements are ambiguous, INS agency "common law" requires an interpreter as a matter of due process at any hearing where the
alien does not understand English. See Matter of Tomas, Int. Dec. 3032, 19 I. & N.
Dec. 464 (BIA 1987) (fundamental fairness requires that an interpreter be provided
when the respondent does not understand English).
Modem due process requires that the opportunity to be heard must be "meaningful." See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254, 267 (1970); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965) (hearing must be held
"at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner"); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). This requirement suggests that when a respondent cannot meaningfully understand the proceedings against him or her, some level of translation may be a constitutionally
irreducible due process requirement. A number of lower federal court decisions have
held in dicta that the requirements of due process include at least some translation of
proceedings. See Tejeda-Mata v. INS, 626 F.2d 721, 726 (9th Cir. 1980) (dictum);
Niarchos v. INS, 393 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1968) (dictum). Recently, the District Court
for the Southern District of New York held directly that translation is a due process
requirement in at least some INS hearings. Abdullah v. INS, 921 F. Supp. 1080, 1098
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
87. See, e.g. The Chinese Exclusion Case (Chae Chan Ping v. United States), 130
U.S. 581, 606 (1889).
88. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952), codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1101-1524. The legislation is also known as the McCarran-Walter Act, particularly
when referring to its provisions barring Communists and others from the country on
ideological grounds.
89. See, e.g., the Alien Registration Act of 1940 ("Smith Act"), ch. 439, 54 Stat.
673, allegedly aimed at Nazi sympathizers, which served as the basis for many deportation actions against Communist Party members and sympathizers. The McCarranWalter Act (the basis for the INA) added a number of ideologically motivated exclusion and deportation provisions to the immigration laws as well. Pub. L. No. 82-414,
66 Stat. 163 (1952).
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seriously restricted the First Amendment rights of association and
freedom of speech 9° of even longtime resident aliens.
The Court's first major pronouncement on these legislative developments, United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy,91 held that
government officials could summarily bar the foreign-born bride of
a United States citizen from the United States on national security
grounds, without a hearing and without informing her of the evidence mandating her exclusion. 2 The Court made no mention of
the American spouse's right to marry or associate with his wife.
The three dissenting Justices, on the other hand, gave great weight
93
to these interests.

The same summary exclusion procedures applied to permanent
resident aliens returning from travel abroad.94 The Court upheld
these provisions, even though this ruling meant that the government could detain an alien with long-term ties to America, a citizen
spouse and property, potentially forever-with no charges lodged
against him or her and no trial. 95 Similarly, in a number of deci90. U.S. CONST. amend. I

91. 338 U.S. 537, 546 (1950).
92. Id. at 546-47. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text (describing effect of
AEDPA in resurrecting summary expulsion). See also Anthony Lewis, How Terrorism Wins, N.Y. TIMES, March 11, 1996, at A17 (describing the then-pending anti-terrorism legislation as "a return to the discredited, and repealed, sections of the
McCarran-Walter Immigration Act under which supposed Communists... were excluded" and the secret evidence provision as "a gross violation of the due process
guaranteed by the Constitution [and] ... another throwback to the McCarran-McCar-

thy period").
93. Knauff, 338 U.S. at 549-550 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("A regulation permitting such exclusion.., in the case of an alien claiming entry on his own account is one
thing. To construe such regulation... to apply to the wife of an honorably discharged
U.S. soldier is quite another thing."); id. at 550-51 (Jackson, J., joined by Black and
Frankfurter, JJ., dissenting) ("[T]his American citizen is told he cannot bring his wife
to the United States, but he will not be told why. He must abandon his bride to live in
his own country or forsake his country to live with his bride.").
94. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); Kwong Hai
Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953). See infra notes 95, 140 (discussing later judicial
and legislative amelioration of the exclusion provisions' effects on permanent
residents).
95. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206. Interestingly, only weeks before announcing its opinion
in Mezei, the Court had held that returning resident aliens had a right of procedural
due process including a full hearing before he or she could be excluded on security
grounds. Kwong Hai Chew, 344 U.S. at 600-01. The Court distinguished one resident
alien from the other on the grounds that Kwong Hai Chew, a seaman, had gotten
clearance for his journey, while Mezei had not. In fact, Mezei had apparently left the
U.S. in emergent circumstances in 1948 to see his dying mother in Rumania, had not
been allowed to enter that country, had spent 19 months in Hungary trying to get
permission to leave Hungary and reenter the United States, and had gotten an immigrant visa from the U.S. Consul in Budapest. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 208. No other coun-
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sions,9 6 the Court upheld deportations of longtime resident aliens
who had once been Communist Party members, even though their

membership ended before the Alien Registration Act,97 ordering
the deportation of alien Communists, went into effect.
Such policies seriously endangered U.S. citizens' own civil liberties. Dissenting in a 1952 Communist deportation case, Carlson v.
Landon,98 Justice Hugo Black noted, "[tihe stark fact is that if
Congress can authorize imprisonment of 'alien Communists' because [they are] dangerous, it can authorize imprisonment of citizen 'Communists' on the same ground."99 Indeed, prosecutions

and jailings of U.S. citizens as well as aliens for "advocacy," especially advocacy of communism or socialism, had been all too com-

mon in U.S. history. 100
try would accept him, leaving him stranded on Ellis Island. Id. at 209. Years later,
Mezei received humanitarian parole but was never formally admitted to the United
States. Thus, he could rejoin his family but he remained in a legal limbo. T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF
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n.1 (2d ed. 1991). The Supreme Court has since clarified that returning lawful permanent residents are constitutionally entitled to due process protection in exclusion proceedings. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982).
96. The best known of these cases include Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580
(1952) (finding no abridgement of freedom of speech or assembly in provision for
deportation of resident alien Communist Party members, and no violation of the prohibition on ex post facto laws even though Party membership ended before date of
enactment); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952) (finding that delegation of discretionary authority to detain Communist Party member aliens without bail to Attorney
General was not unlawful and did not violate Fifth Amendment due process clause);
and Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954) (holding deportation provisions applicable
even if alien successfully showed he did not know of Communist Party's alleged advocacy of violence when he knowingly joined that organization).
97. 54 Stat. 670, § 23 (1940).
98. 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
99. Id. at 552.
100. Wars and the national security "emergencies" that surround them prompt
prosecution and convictions under "criminal anarchy," sedition or related statutes
with grim regularity. See, e.g., the Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217 (1917);
the Sedition Act of 1918, ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553 (1921). During the First World War
years, U.S. prosecutors brought approximately 2,000 cases, mostly under the 1917
Act. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1026 (2d ed. 1991). One of
the best known cases from this period is Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919)
(upholding conviction of prominent Socialist leader and future presidential candidate
Eugene V. Debs for violating Espionage Act of 1917 by speaking against recruitment
of soldiers for U.S. war effort). The states were also active in such prosecutions, and
for many years the United States Supreme Court upheld state criminal syndicalism
and criminal anarchy laws. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (upholding conviction under California Criminal Syndicalism Act); Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652 (1925) (upholding conviction of Communist leader under New York
criminal anarchy statute). The facts of both cases arose in 1919.
The Second World War brought another wave of "advocacy" legislation. See supra
note 89 (giving examples). Once again, the Court upheld the statutes, some of which
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Nor was the ban on "subversive" or "Communist" aliens confined to the 1950s. As late as 1972, the Supreme Court in Kleindienst v. Mandel'01 upheld the exclusion on ideological grounds of

Ernest Mandel, a Marxist journalist and author of a number of
works on Marxist economic theory. l02 Other visa refusals barred

from the United States Hortensia Allende, widow of assassinated
Chilean president Salvador Allende; 0 3 former Nicaraguan Interior
Minister Tomas Borge; 10 4 and former deputy to the Italian Senate
General Nino Pasti, a prominent critic of the United States' European military deployment policies.' 05
(including the Smith Act, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670 (1940), codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2385) are
still on the books, albeit attenuated in scope by later decisions. See, e.g., Yates v.
United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) (finding that "mere" advocacy, even if uttered in
hope that overthrow of government will eventually result, is too remote from such a
consequence to be caught by the Act). By the time of the Yates decision, over 120
leaders of the Communist Party had been tried and mostly convicted under the Smith
Act. STONE ET AL., supra, at 1065. While a complete discussion of these periods of
United States legal history is beyond the scope of this Note, a mention of them places
the Supreme Court's deportation and exclusion holdings from them in some historical
context.
101. 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
102. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972). The Court noted Congress's "almost continuous attention ... to the problems of immigration and of excludability of
certain defined classes of aliens. The pattern generally has been one of increasing
control with particular attention, for almost 70 years now, first to anarchists and then
to those with communist affiliation or views." Id. at 761-62. In finding for the government, the Court dismissed the claim that even if Mandel himself had no "right" to
enter the United States, citizens of this country did have a First Amendment right to
hear him speak. Id. at 762-66.
103. Allende v. Schultz, 845 F.2d 1111 (1st Cir. 1988).
104. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986), affd by an equally divided Court, 484 U.S. 1 (1987) (per curiam). Many other prominent cultural and
political figures appeared on State Department and INS so-called "lookout books,"
meaning that the State Department was likely to deny them visas and INS likely to
bar them from the United States on ideological grounds. See Martin Tolchin, U.S. to
Delete Almost All Names From PoliticalBlacklist ofAliens, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1991,
at Al (naming, inter alia, Nobel laureate writers Gabriel Garcia Marquez and Pablo
Neruda,' novelist Graham Greene, actor Yves Montand, and naturalist Farley Mowat
as appearing in the lookout books).
105. Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1043. Facing severe international criticism of these exclusions based on political beliefs, Congress enacted temporary legislation barring
ideological exclusion of visiting aliens. See Foreign Operations, Export Financing,
and Related Programs Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 100-461, § 555, 102 Stat. 2268,
2268-36 (1989) (temporary measure in effect for two years from date of enactment);
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 100-204, § 901, 101 Stat. 1331, 13391400 (1987) (temporary measure in effect for one year from date of enactment). Congress permanently eliminated most of the political belief-based ideological exclusion
grounds in the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 601(a), 104 Stat. 4978,
5067 (amending INA § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1994)).
However, the 1990 act retained and modernized many closely related exclusion
grounds. See, e.g. Immigration Act of 1990 § 601(e) (codified at INA §§ 212(a)(3), 8
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The most recent wave of immigration cases to reach the
Supreme Court concerned the federal government's widespread
10 7
06
and indefinite detention of thousands of Cuban' and Haitian

refugees who arrived, mainly by sea on rickety boats and rafts, in
the 1980s and early 1990s. The huge size of the refugee wave and
the harsh federal response of interdicting, detaining, and in some
instances forcibly returning the refugees 10 8 brought the underlying
philosophy of immigration law, the immigration plenary power
doctrine, sharp criticism as unjust and incompatible with the American constitutional and historical tradition. 0 9
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3) (1994)) (allowing exclusion due to an alien's "past, current, or
expected beliefs, statements, or associations," if these beliefs, statements or associations "compromise a compelling U.S. foreign policy interest"). The AEDPA (§ 302,
110 Stat. 1214, 1248 (adding INA § 219)) broadens the Immigration Act of 1990's
already loose definition of "terrorists" as an excludable class. Immigration Act of
1990, § 601(e) (codified at INA § 212(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3) (1994)).
106. See, e.g., Mark D. Kemple, Note, Legal Fictions Mask Human Suffering: The
Detention of the Mariel Cubans: Constitutional, Statutory, International Law, and
Human Considerations,62 S. CAL. L. REv. 1733, 1736-38 (1989) (providing numbers
ranging toward 8000 of marielitos detained by INS, or to be detained following completion of criminal sentences, id. at 1737 n.12).
107. See, e.g., Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 161 (1993) (over
25,000 Haitians interdicted at sea in decade following President Reagan's Exec. Order
No. 12,324, 3 C.F.R. § 2(c)(3) (1981-1983 Comp.)); id. at 163 (over 34,000 interdicted
beiween October 1991 and May 1992; 10,497 in the first three weeks of May 1992
alone). See also Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 849-50 (1985) (noting 1700 members of
plaintiff class of Haitians detained without parole since early 1981).
108. For a description of the conditions under which the INS detained Cuban refugees at the Atlanta Federal Penitentiary beginning in 1980, see Kemple, supra note
106, at 1736-43. Kemple cites a House subcommittee report finding detention conditions at the penitentiary to be "brutal and inhumane" and "intolerable." Id. at 1741,
quotingAtlanta Federal Penitentiary: Report of the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. House of
Representatives, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1986). Nevertheless, the INS continued to
transfer Cuban refugees to the prison and took no steps to improve conditions there.
Kemple, supra note 106, at 1742.
When Haiti's dictator Jean-Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier fell in 1986, and again in
1991 when a military coup deposed democratically elected Haitian president Jean
Bertrand Aristide, thousands of Haitians fled to the United States on dangerously
overloaded boats and fragile rafts. The Reagan, Bush and Clinton Administrations
have all ordered the United States Coast Guard to interdict any refugees found in
international waters. See Exec. Order No. 12,324, 3 C.F.R. 181 (1981-1983) (Reagan
order); Exec. Order No. 12,807, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,133 (1992) (Bush order, which President Clinton renewed). At various times, the Coast Guard returned refugees to Haiti
with no determination of whether they would be subject to persecution there; held
them aboard Coast Guard cutters pending determination of their claims; and transported them to U.S. bases at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and later in Panama for detention. See generally Sale, 509 U.S. at 159-67 (describing circumstances and quoting
Bush Executive Order).
109. Motomura, Phantom Norms, supra note 23, at 547; see generally Schuck, supra
note 5; Legomsky, supra note 36.
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In 1985 the Supreme Court decided Jean v. Nelson,110 a case involving the indefinite detention of Haitian refugees who had
reached U.S. soil. Amid growing criticism of the immigration plenary power doctrine,"' many scholars foresaw the doctrine's imminent demise and hoped for the application of normal standards of
judicial review to immigration cases. 1 2 The Court's decision in
Jean did not bear out these expectations. Avoiding all constitutional entanglements, the Court decided the case on procedural
grounds.

13

II. Stare Decisis and the Immigration Law Plenary
Power Doctrine
A. The Problems with Plenary Power
With no clear constitutional text to guide it, the Supreme Court
in large part created Congress's power over immigration matters
by acquiescing to Congress's actions. 4 The Court held Congress's
power to pass legislation regulating immigration to be inherent in
U.S. sovereignty, 115 and further found:
That the government of the United States, through the action of
the legislative department, can exclude aliens from its territory
is a proposition which we do not think open to controversy. Jurisdiction over its own territory to that extent is an incident of
every independent nation. It is part of its independence. If it
be to that extent subject to the
could not exclude aliens it would
6
control of another power."
The Court found that there had never been any question that paupers, criminals and the diseased, for example, could be excluded,
110. 472 U.S. 846 (1985). The Court, however, did not reach the petitioners' argu-

ments to reevaluate the plenary power doctrine, deciding the case on procedural
grounds. See infra note 113.
111. Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural
Surrogatesfor Substantive ConstitutionalRights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625, 1627 n. 10
(1992) [hereinafter Curious Evolution] (citing recent scholarly articles).

112. Id.; see also Schuck, supra note 5, at 3-4, 73-90.
113. Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 855-57 (1985) (finding that Court of Appeals

properly remanded to district court for consideration of whether INS had violated its
own regulations, but finding regulations nondiscriminatory; further finding that Court
of Appeals should not have reached petitioners' constitutional arguments when ruling
on detainee parole denials).
114. See Ibrahim J. Wani, Truth, Strangers, and Fiction: The Illegitimate Uses of
Legal Fiction in Immigration Law, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 51, 67-75 (1989) (describing

evolution of Court's theory of sovereignty).
115. The Chinese Exclusion Case (Chae Chan Ping v. United States), 130 U.S. 581,
604 (1889).
116. Id at 603-04.
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even if no statute so provided." 7 At least one commentator has
speculated that such reasoning suited the Court's needs in the Chi-

nese Exclusion ruling better than a finding of legislative power over
immigration
through the text of the Constitution would have
18
done.'

Furthermore, the immigration regulatory power's special ex-

traconstitutional standing as a power inherent in nationhood, from
which flows Congress's absolute, unreviewable power to regulate
immigration, 119 is inconsistent with American constitutional history
and tradition. 2 ° In the Framers' scheme of government, sovereignty lies in the people, not Congress, which is the beneficiary only

of such powers as the people choose to delegate to it in the Constitution.1 2 ' In this conception of sovereignty, Congress's plenary
117. Id. at 608-09. The Court cited for this proposition a nation's inherent right to
self-preservation and correspondence between James G. Blaine, Secretary of State
under President Arthur and the U.S. minister to Switzerland. Blaine stated that there
was in the United States "no room outside of its prisons or almshouses" for criminals
and paupers who had become a burden on their own countries. (Emphasis supplied.)
This latter proposition does not appear to imply a doctrine of excludability. It merely
indicates confinement to institutions on the same terms as U.S. citizens in a like situation, a clear desire that the foreign equivalent not come to the United States, and a
hope that their governments would not encourage them. Of course, it is doubtful that
Blaine suspected he was laying the foundation for Supreme Court precedent when he
wrote the remarks cited. For a modem-day example of Blaine's complaint, see supra
note 108 (describing treatment, including indefinite detention upon arrival in United
States, of Cuban marielitos, some of whom Castro released from jails and mental
institutions).
118. Wani, supra note 114, at 62 ("It is not far fetched.., to speculate that sovereignty perfectly fit the Court's purpose at the time, a purpose that a constitutionally
derived source of power would not have as easily fulfilled.").
119. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 609 ("Whether a proper consideration
by our government of its previous laws, or a proper respect for the nation whose
subjects are affected by its action, ought to have qualified its inhibition ... are not
questions for judicial determination."). By phrasing its rationale in these terms, the
Court implicitly created a nonjusticiable "political question," excusing itself from any
further consideration of the exclusion legislation, no matter what its ultimate effects
on individuals. See infra notes 143-48 and accompanying text.
120. Wani, supra note 114, at 66-67. While Professor Wani notes that undoubtedly
there are areas where federal power must preempt the states, he believes the Court's
emphasis on the doctrine and its further development (e.g., as reflected in United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936), a case which has aroused
much comment and controversy since its decision) is wrong as a matter of constitutional theory. Wani, supra note 114, at 75-78.
121. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 513 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Ros-

siter ed., 1961) (arguing that a bill of rights was not necessary in the proposed Constitution, as "[h]ere, in strictness, the people surrender nothing; and as they retain
everything they have no need of particular reservations .... "); see also GORDON S.
WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC

1776-1787 at 530-32, 544-47

(1969) (sovereign power resides in the people, not in state or federal government,
under the United States' constitutional scheme). The states themselves have essen-
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power to pass laws in constitutionally enumerated areas is central
to the American system of government. 122 Consequently, the
Supreme Court has given Congress wide latitude to legislate in areas "necessary and proper" to the execution of its enumerated
23
powers.

1

In McCulloch v. Maryland, one of the earliest cases to touch on
the scope of the "necessary and proper" power, the Court held that
"the powers given to the government imply the ordinary means of

their execution,' 1 24 including any necessary auxiliary legislation.
However, the principle of limited, enumerated powers does set

outer limits on Congress's "necessary and proper" legislative authority. 125 Furthermore, the very existence of a written Constitution binds Congress to the6 terms of that document, which is the
2
supreme law of the land.'
The authority to regulate immigration, however, is a horse of a
different color. The Supreme Court simply assumed the existence
of a power in Congress to exclude and expel noncitizens at will as
"an incident of every independent nation"'1 27 and "not ...open to

controversy.' 2 8 This assumption is not the "ordinary means of execution' 29 of any enumerated power, but an entirely new source of

power to legislate. In rationalizing this extraconstitutional source
of power, the Chinese Exclusion Court believed, at least implicitly,
tially no power to regulate immigration. E.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225 (1982)
("The States enjoy no power with respect to the classification of aliens," in this case to
deny a public education by state law). However, as previously noted, a federal power
to do so is nowhere enumerated in the Constitution, which speaks only of naturalization, not at all the same thing as the conditions of entry and stay of an alien in the
United States. See supra note 117; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
122. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (setting forth powers of Congress).
123. Id. at cl. 18.
124. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 409 (1819).
125. See Henkin, A Century of Chinese Exclusion, supra note 31, at 862 n.46, quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5 (1957) ("The United States is entirely a creature of
the Constitution. Its power and authority have no other source. It can only act in
accordance with all the limitations imposed by the Constitution.").
126. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("Certainly all those
who have framed written contsitutions comtemplate them as forming the fundamental
and paramount law of the nation, and, consequently, the theory of every such government must be, that an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void.").
See also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973) (holding unconstitutional a Border Patrol unit's warrantless search of Mexican citizen's automobile
within the United States for lack of reasonable suspicion of illegal presence or activity) ("It is clear, of course, that no Act of Congress can authorize a violation of the
Constitution.").
127. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 603.
128. Id.
129. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 409.
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that the Constitution's framers, in founding a sovereign nation, also
assumed that powers "inherent" in sovereignty 13
existed,
thus ex0
plaining the Constitution's silence on the matter.
Legal fictions13 1 of various kinds have dominated immigration
case law since its beginnings. 132 A forest of fictions has grown up
around the concept of "entry," defined, until recently, 33 decep130. See, e.g., The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 609. Even if the Court's
assumption about the framers' views is true, the framers' clearly expressed idea of a
federal government of limited, enumerated powers should still cause the Court discomfort in making sweeping pronouncements about the practically limitless scope of
the plenary power to regulate immigration. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 29093 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961), in particular id. at 292 ("[t]he powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and
defined"). Yet Court majorities from The Chinese Exclusion Case to the present day
have felt free to make such sweeping pronouncements with an untroubled conscience,
despite dissenters' qualms. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 758 (Field, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court allowed Congress to exceed the scope of its limited powers by extending unlimited plenary immigration regulatory authority to deportation of
aliens already present in the United States); id. at 737 (Brewer, J., dissenting) ("axiomatic" that federal government is one of enumerated powers); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 600 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Justice Brewer's
Fong Yue Ting dissent noting the "indefinite and dangerous" nature of powers inherent in sovereignty, and questioning why such a power should defeat the Fifth Amendment's expressly stated right to life and liberty).
131. A legal fiction is an "[a]ssumption of fact made by a court as basis for deciding
a legal question. A situation contrived by the law to permit a court to dispose of a

matter, though it need not be created improperly ....

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

894 (6th ed. 1990). Another source defines legal fiction as "an assumption that certain facts exist, whether or not they really do exist, so that a principle of law may be
applied in order to achieve justice on the facts as they do exist." BARRON'S LAW
DICTIONARY 273 (3rd ed. 1991).
Professor Ibrahim J. Wani notes the special character of immigration law fictions,
which "range from nebulous abstractions to outright distortions and misrepresentations. They are often used to achieve ends that would be unthinkable in other areas
of American law and popular belief. In many respects, immigration law fictions also
tend to substitute for the sound, enquiring and searching analysis expected and demanded of judicial decision-making." Wani, supra note 114, at 53.
132. See generally Wani, supra note 114. Professor Wani exhaustively discusses the
use and abuse of fiction in the immigration area and identifies four main fictions in
immigration law: sovereignty, an idea created to legitimate federal regulation of immigration, id. at 63-84; the entry fiction, "the most deceptive and sometimes embarrassing use of legal fiction," id. at 54, 89-96; concepts such as detention and
punishment, especially in the distinction between criminal and civil matters, id. at 97100; and the concept of national community as an underlying ideology which legitimates unjust immigration policies, id. at 106-116.
133. IIRIRA's Title III redefined the entire concept of "entry," creating a unified
"removal" procedure that replaces the separate deportation and exclusion provisions
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and eliminating "entry" in favor of an "admission" definition which includes only the inspection and formal admission process.
IIRIRA sec. 301(a), § 101(a)(13) (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)), 142 CONG. REC.
H11795-96 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1996). This new concept also redefines aliens who are
within the United States and have not been formally inspected and admitted as "ap-
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tively simply, as "any coming of an alien into the United States,
from a foreign port or place or from an outlying possession,
As long ago as
"134
whether voluntarily or otherwise ....
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, the Supreme Court held that even
though officials might remove an alien from shipboard and bring
her into the United States for further processing, that alien still had
not "entered" the United States. 135 This idea became the basis for

the "entry" fiction, one of the most harshly criticized doctrines of
American immigration law, under which an alien physically present
in the United States is still "abroad" and without constitutional

protections. 136 Notwithstanding this long-running criticism, how-

ever, IIRIRA has actually extended the "entry" fiction by law to all
aliens within the United States who have not been inspected and
or are awaiting
admitted, not just those who have been paroled
137
adjudication of their applications for entry.

plicants for entry," enabling Title III's summary expulsion process to be employed
against them. IIRIRA sec. 302(a)(1), § 235 (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1225), 142 CONG.
REC. H11796 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1996) (defining "applicants for admission" physically present in the United States without having been inspected and admitted);
IIRIRA sec. 302(b), § 235 (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1225), 142 CONG. REc. H1196-97
(daily ed. Sept. 28, 1996) (inspection and expedited removal proceeding). See also
infra, note 137 and accompanying text.
134. INA § 101(a)(13), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (1994). The provision contains an
exception for permanent resident aliens who can show that their departure was not
intentional or reasonably expected. Id.
135. 142 U.S. 651, 662 (1892). In so ruling, the Court summarily accepted Congress's power to create such fictional constructs when defining "entry" into the
United States regardless of the effect such definitions might have on an individual's
constitutional rights in the future. See Act of March 3, 1891, § 8, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1085;
Nishimura Ekiu, 142 U.S. at 661-62 (quoting relevant sections of the Act without further comment). The effect of the Nishimura Ekiu decision was to create a future class
of individuals who might be physically present on U.S. soil and even at large under
parole into the United States for many years, but who would still have few constitutional protections. See Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228, 230-31 (1925) (holding that an
alien paroled into the United States nine years previously had never "entered or
dwelt in the United States" for purposes of obtaining an immigration benefit). See
also Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958) (alien must "enter" the United
States in order to accrue rights and ties to the United States).
The Act of March 3, 1891 designated "idiots, insane persons, paupers, or persons
likely to become a public charge, persons suffering from a loathsome or a dangerous
contagious disease; persons who had been convicted of a felony or other infamous
crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude" and a few other classes as excludable, and provided for inspection of all arriving aliens by immigration officials under
the auspices of the Treasury Department. Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S.
538, 542 (1895) (describing the Act).
136. See infra notes 138-142 and accompanying text for a discussion of the effects of
the entry doctrine as a legal fiction.
137. IIRIRA, sec. 303(a) and (b), § 235(a) and (b) (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1225
(1994)), 142 CONG. REC. Hl1796-97 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1996) (defining, respectively,
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The severe consequences of this fiction for individuals, who can
be separated forever from their homes and families in the United
States, 138 have made entry fiction one of the most harshly criticized
aspects of immigration statutory and case law.' 39 At times, the entry fiction's draconian consequences have been too much even for
the Supreme Court, which has buried the entry fiction under a
mound of additional legal fictions. The Court has held, for in-

stance, that an alien who did not intend to leave the United States
does not really "enter" upon his or her return, since he or she had
never "left" in the first place. 40 The Court resorted to this toraliens to be treated as applicants for admission and the inspection/expedited removal
process for aliens not admitted); see also supra note 133.
138. See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953), and
supra note 42.
139. See generally Brian K. Bates, A Brief Tour of Wonderland: A PracticalIntroduction to Exclusion Proceedings, 90-01 IMMIGRATION BRIEFINGS (January 1990);
Wani, supra note 114 (discussing courts' use of the entry doctrine to avoid constitutional and other substantive issues); see also id. at 91-92 ("It has been described as
scandalous, shocking, morally outrageous, deplorable, an embarrassment and an
anomaly in constitutional government. Despite its acknowledged falsity and outrageousness, entry has had tremendous staying power and is still used as the primary
determinant of procedural due process."); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress
To Limit the Jurisdictionof Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic,66 HARVARD L.
REV. 1362, 1389-96 (1953); id. at 1395 ("I cannot believe that judges adequately aware
of the foundations of principle in this field would permit themselves to trivialize the
great guarantees of due process and the freedom writ [of habeas corpus] by such
distinctions [between "entry" and "non-entry"]."); Kemple, supra note 106, at 1791
(logic of deportation cases and deportation and exclusion provisions of immigration
law allows "no reasonable inference that Congress intended to authorize the Attorney
General either to incarcerate excludable aliens longer than deportable aliens or to
detain excludable aliens indefinitely"); Ethan A. Klingsberg, Note, Penetrating the
Entry Doctrine: Excludable Aliens' Constitutional Rights, 98 YALE L.J. 639 (1989)
(proposing an entitlement model based on Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), to
replace the doctrine). For a recent account of the entry doctrine's consequences to
individuals, see Alisa Solomon, The Worst Prison System in America, VILLAGE
VOICE, Aug. 8, 1995, at 25 (in the wake of an inmate uprising at an Elizabeth, New
Jersey INS detention facility, describing deplorable detention center conditions and
immigration detainees' lack of constitutional rights).
140. Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 459-60 (1963). Fleuti involved a gay man
who became a U.S. permanent resident before Congress barred homosexual aliens
from entering the United States. See former INA § 212(a)(4), 8 U.S.C § 1182(a)(4),
66 Stat. 182 (1952), repealed by Immigration Act of 1990, P.L. 101-649, § 601(a), 104
Stat. 4978, 5067. Fleuti was safe as long as he did not leave the United States, as the
statute only barred entries by homosexual aliens. He spent an afternoon in Mexico in
1956, after the ban on homosexuals went into effect, and returned to the United States
without incident. However, in 1959 the government sought to deport Fleuti as "afflicted with psychopathic personality" upon his 1956 return from Mexico, an entry to
which the new law applied. Fleuti, 374 U.S. at 450-51; INA § 241(a)(1), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1251 (a)(1) (1994) (rendering deportable an alien excludable under any provision of
the law in effect at the time of that alien's entry into the United States).
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tured reasoning in order to avoid confronting the substantive con14 1
stitutionality of the entry fiction and its statutory codifications.
As IIRIRA has extended the scope of the "entry doctrine" even
further to include aliens entering the United States without inspection (who will be susceptible to summary removal, if they cannot

prove continuous physical presence in the United States throughout the previous two years), 42 the Supreme Court may now be
compelled, in the interests of due process and fundamental fairness, to face this issue directly.

Another facet of the Court's passivity and abstentionism on immigration questions stems from its early holdings that immigration
legislation presents nonjusticiable "political questions" because of
its foreign affairs implications. 43 The "political question" approach to immigration legislation relies on two assumptions: that
Congress's immigration decisions inherently affect foreign affairs,
and that such foreign policy decisions are necessarily "political
Fleuti argued that then-INA § 212(a)(4) was unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari on that issue. Id. at 451. However, the
Court did not reach the constitutional issue, deciding instead to give relief to Fleuti
through a broad reading of an "unintended departure" exception to the "entry" definition. Under this broad reading, Fleuti had in effect never left the United States on
that afternoon in 1956. Id. at 458-59. This judicial sleight of hand prevented the ban
on homosexuals from applying to Fleuti in the circumstances of his case. Id. at 453.
The Ninth Circuit had ruled the INA's "psychopathic personality" clause unconstitutionally vague as applied to homosexuals, prompting Congress to amend the provision by adding the term "sexual deviate." Fleuti v. Rosenberg, 302 F.2d 652 (9th Cir.
1962), vacated on other grounds, 374 U.S. 449 (1963); Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No.
89-236, § 15(b), 79 Stat. 911 (amending former INA § 212(a)(4), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(4)). The Supreme Court never ruled the "sexual deviate" homosexual bar
unconstitutional, and it remained the law of this land until 1990, when Congress repealed it. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978, § 601
(amending INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182).
The Fleutiexception to the entry doctrine requires that an absence from the United
States be "innocent, casual, and brief" in order to avoid making an entry upon return.
Fleuti, 374 U.S. at 462-63. This finding can be vitally important, for instance, when an
alien seeks a benefit available only after a given period of continuous residence in the
United States. See, e.g., INA § 244, 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1994) (providing for discretionary
suspension of deportation proceedings and granting of permanent residence to aliens
meeting various requirements, including seven years of continuous residence in the
United States).
141. Fleuti, 374 U.S. at 468 (Clark, Harlan, Stewart and White, JJ., dissenting). The
four dissenters believed the Court should have reached the constitutional question.
Presumably, since the four did not concur in the result, they would have upheld the
"psychopathic personality" provision as applied to homosexuals.
142. IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, sec. 302(b)(1)(A)(iii)(I) and (II), § 235 (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1225), 142 CONG. REC. H11796 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1996).
143. Legomsky, supra note 36, at 261-62.
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questions.' 1 44 Neither of these assumptions necessarily holds true
in any given immigration case, 145 although in theory one or both
considerations may apply. 46 Notably, the leading "political ques144. Id.; see also Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (granting certiorari, vacating, and remanding for dismissal a case in which the Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit had held that President Carter could withdraw recognition from Taiwan without consulting Congress). Using disparate rationales, five Justices in Goldwater found
that the issue presented-distinctly one of foreign affairs-was not a political question, while four found that it was.
Some authorities do not believe that the political question doctrine as such truly
exists. See, e.g., Henkin, Is There a "PoliticalQuestion" Doctrine?, supra note 36, at
600-01 ("political questions" really reflect the prudential consideration of respect toward the coordinate branches; matters within the powers granted to those branches
are found constitutional, not dismissed as "political questions"). Professor Wechsler
went even further: "[T]he only proper judgment that may lead to an abstention from
decision is that the Constitution has committed the determination of the issue to another agency of government than the courts." Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral
Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 9 (1959). Such a finding itself,
of course, requires a court to exercise its interpretive powers. Id. at 8.
Greater clarity results when the doctrine is seen as one of political remedies, which
a court could not grant without violating the separation of powers. Professor Henkin
argues that even in the case of the Constitution's "republican form of government"
clause at Art. IV, § 4, perhaps the most intractable source of political questions and
most often offered as a prime example of the doctrine, courts could rule on one of
several non-political question grounds that the claims involved asserted no constitutional cause of action upon which relief could be granted. Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?,supra note 36, at 607-10. If the only remedies that plaintiffs
can propose require the court to play the role of one of the political branches, then
there is simply no relief that the court could constitutionally grant.
Even where this is the case, Professor Henkin proposes that the courts could avoid
totally foreclosing themselves from examining such questions by invoking the doctrine of "want of equity" to deny relief. Id. at 617-22. The Supreme Court acted in
such a fashion, he argues, in Giligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973), in which Kent
State University students sought to restrain future unconstitutional activities of the
Ohio National Guard. The Court held that "[t]he relief sought.., would.., embrace
critical areas of responsibility vested by the Constitution in the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government" and that it would be "inappropriate" for a judge to
intervene in these areas. 413 U.S. at 7-8.
145. Legomsky, supra note 36, at 262-69. In examining the application of the
"political question" doctrine to immigration cases, Professor Legomsky notes that it
"ignores reality" to assume that every such question is "so intimately rooted in foreign policy that the usual scope of judicial review would hamper the effective conduct
of foreign relations," and that the very structure of the immigration laws-giving an
administrative agency, the INS, pride of place and the State Department a secondary
role, militates against such an assumption. Id. at 262 n.34 and accompanying text.
Professor Legomsky further notes that even immigration statutes targeting a specific nationality, such as the Chinese Exclusion Act, see supra note 52, are more convincingly explained as the result of domestic pressure than as implicating foreign
affairs. Legomsky, supra note 36, at 262, 286-95 (describing at length historical factors
and specific events involving various nations which may have influenced judicial opinion in immigration cases involving aliens of those nationalities).
146. See id. at 262-63 (a finding that foreign affairs were actually affected in a given
case may mandate judicial deference; reference to aliens of a particular nationality
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tion" case, Baker v. Carr,1 47 required an inquiry into the precise
facts presented in a case before finding the matter at hand

nonjusticiable.' 18
The political question/foreign affairs nexus in immigration case

law arose in its modern form after the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Curtiss-WrightExport Corp.1 4 9 The Court, in ruling that Congress could constitutionally delegate authority to the

President to issue an executive order halting arms trade to warring
Paraguay and Bolivia, held that the federal government possesses

sweeping and essentially unreviewable powers in international affairs.1 50 Curtiss-Wright also enunciated the radical and controver-

sial idea that the plenary foreign affairs powers do not derive from
the Constitution at all.15 1 Curtiss-Wrightindicated a number of armay be persuasive evidence that foreign policy considerations were the basis for an
executive order or statute). A specific example for Professor Legomsky was the series of executive orders and INS directives enacted to control the activities of Iranian
students in the United States during the Iranian hostage crisis. Id. at 294. See also
TRIBE, supra note 39, § 5-16, at 353 (1988) (in war and alien cases, the "peculiarly
'national' character of the power granted Congress limits judicial review" in ways
"seemingly inconsistent with the usual restraints on congressional power").
147. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
148. Id. at 217 ("The doctrine of which we treat is one of 'political questions,' not
one of 'political cases.' The courts cannot reject as 'no lawsuit' a bona fide controversy as to whether some action denominated 'political' exceeds constitutional
authority.").
Baker v. Carr laid out a number of factors to consider in finding a controversy to be
a nonjusticiable political question. These include a "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment" to another branch; "lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards"; the case cannot be decided without making policy determinations
clearly meant for nonjudicial discretion; the dispute cannot be resolved without disrespect to a coordinate branch; unusual need for unquestioning adherence to political
decisions already made; and potential of embarrassment from multiple pronouncements on an issue. 369 U.S. at 217; see TRIBE, supra note 39, § 3-16, at 71 n.1. Professor Tribe finds that typically in political question jurisprudence the issue at hand is
"political" not because it is of any particular concern to the political branches, but
because the constitutional provisions that a party invokes do not lend themselves to
judicial application to the matter at hand. Id., § 3-16, at 75. That, however, edges into
a failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted (e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)),
which does not imply nonjusticiability of the issue on any ground, but only on those
invoked.
149. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
150. Id. at 315-29 (discussing distinction between domestic powers, which are enumerated in the Constitution, and external powers, which the Contsitution does not
touch beyond committing them to the political branches).
151. Id. at 315-16 ("The broad statement that the federal government can exercise
no powers except those specifically enumerated in the Constitution, and such implied
powers as are necessary and proper to carry into effect the enumerated powers, is
categorically true only in respect of our internal affairs."); see also Henkin, A Century
of Chinese Exclusion, supra note 31, at 858 (immigration regulation is "surely" one of
Curtiss-Wright's "powers inherent in national sovereignty"). Aspects of Sutherland's
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eas in which the Court "found the warrant for its conclusions not in
15
the provisions of the Constitution, but in the law of. nations.'
Ironically, one of these areas was the "power to expel undesirable
aliens," which
is "inherently inseparable from the conception of
53
nationality."
Curtiss-Wright's sweeping approach to government power found

an echo in the Court's immigration rulings from the 1950s. In a
number of alien Communist deportation cases during that period,
the Court relied on broad pronouncements on government power
similar to those in Curtiss-Wright to uphold the exclusion and deportation of ideologically unsavory aliens.' 54 However, while the
"external sovereignty" include the war and treaty powers, which the Constitution distributes between the political branches. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11-14 (war power
and regulation of armed forces committed to Congress); id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (president
is commander in chief of armed forces); id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (committing power to
conclude treaty to President with advice and consent of Senate).
Justice Sutherland's theory that "external" sovereignty bypassed the Constitution
and came to rest in the federal government as an attribute of sovereignty is fundamentally at odds with the American conception that sovereignty resides in the people,
except insofar as "We the People" delegated enumerated functions of sovereignty to
the federal government in the Constitution. See Charles A. Lofgren, United States v.
Curtiss-WrightExport Corporation: An Historical Reassessment, 83 YALE L. J. 1, 2930 (1973) (noting that Sutherland's historical and precedential evidence for the assertion of extraconstitutional, inherent external affairs power actually suggest that
"[f]ederal power in foreign affairs rests on explicit and implicit constitutional grants
and derives from the ordinary constitutive authority").
152. 299 U.S. at 318.
153. Id. (citing Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893)). Despite Justice Sutherland's use of the immigration example, the Court in the 1880s and '90s
more than once stated that the paramount law of the Constitution could require it to
intervene in the immigration area. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 713; see also
The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 604 (war, treaty, commerce and other "sovereign powers" from which Court infers power to regulate immigration are "restricted
in their exercise only by the constitution itself").
Professor Lofgren points out that The Chinese Exclusion Case serves as a shaky
ground for Justice Sutherland's premise of extraconstitutional federal foreign affairs
powers for yet another reason: Justice Field, writing in that case, indicated the alien
exclusion power to be "an incident of sovereignty belonging to the government of the
United States, as a part of those sovereign powers delegated by the constitution......
130 U.S. at 609 (emphasis added), quoted in Lofgren, supra note 151, at 18.
154. The Court in United States ex rel. Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950),
relied directly on Curtiss-Wrightin dismissing petitioner's argument that the regulations under which she was ordered excluded were an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power, stating that "[t]he right [to exclude aliens] stems not alone from
legislative power but is inherent in the executive power to control the foreign affairs
of the nation." Knauff, 338 U.S. at 542 (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318-22 (1936)). Justice Sutherland in fact cited the immigration
plenary power doctrine as one of the bases for his finding of an extraconstitutional
origin of the executive foreign affairs power. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 318 (citing
"the power to expel undesirable aliens," among others, as not expressly affirmed by
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Court has retreated from Curtiss-Wright's extraconstitutional theo-

ries of discretionary power in the political branches, 155 it has never
reevaluated its abstentionist attitude toward the nation's immigration laws.

the Constitution but nevertheless "inherently inseparable from the conception of nationality," the Court finding "the warrant for its conclusions not in the provisions of
the Constitution, but in the law of nations").
Cases not directly citing Curtiss-Wright but adhering to much of its reasoning include Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954) ("The power of Congress over the
admission of aliens and their right to remain is necessarily very broad, touching as it
does basic aspects of national sovereignty, more particularly our foreign relations and
the national security."); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210
(1953) (courts recognize power to exclude and expel aliens as a "fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government's political departments largely immune
from judicial control"); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952) ("any
policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and the maintenance
of a republican form of government. Such matters are so exclusively entrusted to the
political branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or
interference.") (footnote omitted). Cf Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 542-44
(1952) (addressing a claim of unconstitutional delegation to the executive branch
without reference to Curtiss-Wright).
Note that the Court wrote all but one of the above' quotations in the passive voice,
conveniently excusing itself from tracing the exact origins of the political branches'
power in the immigration area with greater precision. The one exception, the Galvan
quotation, touches only on the breadth of the power, not on its source.
155. E.g., Lofgren, supra note 151 passim. The Supreme Court has never overruled
Curtiss-Wright,but it has brought most aspects of the foreign affairs power within the
Constitution's bounds. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (treaty power) (nothing
in the Supremacy Clause or history of Constitution's enactment suggests that treaties
do not have to comply with Constitution and holding that the Bill of Rights limits all
congressional powers, including control over the armed forces); The Paquete Habana,
175 U.S. 677 (1900) (war power) (finding that Supreme Court could review question
of whether seizure of Spanish civilian fishing vessels was militarily justified; further
finding that seizure in fact was unjustified and ordering vessels' return). Some Executive decisions may be unreachable through the courts and subject only to political
control, e.g., through the power of the pursestrings. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S.
996 (1979) (granting certiorari, vacating and remanding with directions to dismiss), in
which a highly divided Court found President Carter's decision to withdraw diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to be theoretically justiciable, but presenting an almost
insurmountable ripeness problem, as Congress would have had to cause a constitutional impasse by taking some undefined "appropriate formal action" to challenge
Carter's discretionary determination. Id. at 1002. See also Dellums v. Bush, 752 F.
Supp. 1141 (D.C. 1990) (denying on ripeness grounds petition for an order restraining
President Bush from launching Persian Gulf attack without Congresssional authorization, as only 10% of members of Congress had sued). For a general discussion of the
courts' reach in interbranch and foreign affairs disputes, see Henkin, Is There a Political Question Doctrine?, supra note 36 passim.
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B.

The Uses and Abuses of Precedent: Staring Decisively at the
Immigration Plenary Power Doctrine

Stare decisis, the doctrine that a court's decisions on a particular
issue become precedents binding on lower courts and stand absent
good cause to overturn them, 56 serves a number of purposes in the

common-law legal tradition. It allows for stability and a certain
level of predictability in judicial decisionmaking. 5 7 Stare decisis
serves reliance interests by making it possible, at least to some extent, to determine what the law on a particular topic is. 158 Stare
decisis also adds to public acceptance of judicial authority by providing a powerful counterbalance to political pressure toward a de-

sired result: a court that stands firm against such pressure becomes
more legitimate in the eyes of the people as that court appears, at

least, to base its decisions on some principle above and beyond the
political whim of the moment. 5 9
All of these stare decisis interests contribute to the American
perception of the "rule of law.' 16° In this regard, stare decisis
serves as insurance that judges will base their decisions on "neutral
156. BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 1406 (6th ed. 1990).
157. See, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, The Pressure of Precedent A Critique of the

ConservativeApproaches to Stare Decisis in Abortion Cases, 10

CONST. COMMENTARY

67, 69-70 (1993); Earl M. Maltz, Abortion, Precedent, and the Constitution: A Comment on Planned Parenthoodof Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 68 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 11 passim (1992); William 0. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735
passim (1949) (all describing stability, neutrality, reliance and related interests and
values which stare decisis purports to enhance).
158. This is true, of course, only insofar as the facts of one's matter accord with
those of previously decided cases or precisely fit a legislated rule. See, e.g., BENJAMIN
N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 143 (1922) ("No doubt the
ideal system, if it were attainable, would be a code at once so flexible and so minute,
as to supply in advance for every conceivable situation the just and fitting rule. But
life is too complex to bring the attainment of this ideal within the compass of human
powers."). But cf. Felix Cohen, The EthicalBasis of Legal Criticism,41 YALE L.J. 201,
216 (1931) ("elementary logic teaches us that every legal decision and every finite set
of decisions can be subsumed under an infinite number of different general rules, just
as an infinite number of different curves may be traced trough any point or finite
collection of points. Every decision is a choice between different rules, which logically
fit all past decisions but logically dicate conflicting results in the instant case."). See
also supra note 157 and sources cited therein.
159. See, e.g., Gerhardt, supra note 157, at 80-81 (criticizing Rehnquist/Scalia approach of overruling "erroneously reasoned" precedent as injecting instability into
constitutional law by failing to recognize impact of majoritarian pressure on the
Court, e.g., through judicial appointments). Professor Gerhardt also notes that such
"political" overrulings create instability by encouraging judicial appointments to "politically" overrule the new precedent. "Such instability ultimately fosters an image of
constitutional law as being nothing more than politics being carried on in a different
forum." Id. at 82.
160. Note, ConstitutionalStare Decisis, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1345, 1349 (1990).
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principles,"' 161 and that the judiciary will uphold the Constitution

even if the political majority currently finds the Constitution's
mandates unpalatable.

62

In contrast, the Court's refusal to review the constitutionality of
Congress's immigration legislation violates this expectation of judicial review of acts of Congress. 63 Whether one regards judicial
review as a nuisance 64 or a duty,165 it is a well-accepted part of the

American constitutional landscape and one which the American
people have come to rely upon. 166 If for no other reason, the
161. See Wechsler, supra note 144, at 19:
The courts have both the title and the duty when a case is properly before
them to review the actions of the other branches in the light of constitutional
provisions ....

In doing so, however, they are bound to function otherwise

than as a naked power organ; they participate as courts of law. This calls for
facing how determinations of this kind can be asserted to have any legal
quality. The answer, I suggest, inheres primarily in that they are-or are
obliged to be-entirely principled. A principled decision, in the sense I have
in mind, is one that rests on reasons with respect to all the issues in the case,
reasons that in their generality and their neutrality transcend any immediate
result that is involved.
Stare decisis serves these interests because its requirement of justification for change
encourages searching reflection on the justifications for both the old and the possible
new rule. Such reflection adds to the rule's legitimacy, whether the court making the
ruling upholds or overturns it, and that legitimacy is essential to the Court's power.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,

1961). But see Maltz, supra note 157, at 21-22 (questioning that the public pays close
attention to the Supreme Court's reasoning and noting that the Court has not lost
legitimacy even from its major disruptions of precedent).
162. See ALEXANDER

BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH

16-23 (1962) (dis-

cussing "countermajoritarian difficulty" of justifying the institution of judicial review);
see also Note, ConstitutionalStare Decisis, supra note 160, at 1350 (doctrine of stare
decisis helps to overcome "countermajoritarian difficulty" by requiring special justification for overruling a previous decision, thereby reducing fear that judges make decisions arbitrarily).
163. BICKEL, supra note 162, at 14. See also Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149
U.S. 698, 761 (1893) (Fuller, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing majority holding that immigration regulation is a political question committed to the political departments, Congress and the Executive, id. at 712-13; "[h]owever reluctant courts may be to pass
upon the constitutionality of legislative acts, it is of the very essence of judicial duty to
do so, when the discharge of that duty is properly invoked").
164. See LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958) ("For myself it would be
most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of nine Platonic Guardians, even if I knew how to
choose them, which I assuredly do not."). Judge Hand felt that the power of Supreme
Court review, particularly over the state courts, had no textual basis in the Constitution, although, he believed, "it was not a lawless act to import into the Constitution
such a grant of power." Wechsler, supra note 144, at 3, quoting HAND, supra, at 29.
165. E.g., Wechsler, supra note 144, at 1-10 (power of judicial review has a textual
basis in the Constitution's Supremacy Clause, art. VI, § 2 and in Article III; in addition, at least some of the framers, particularly Hamilton, assumed its existence); Fong
Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 761 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting), quoted supra note 163.
166. See supra notes 161-65 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court, in the interest of its own legitimacy, 167 needs to
review immigration legislation by the same standards as legislation
in any other area.
One hundred years of precedent claims to support the current
state of immigration jurisprudence, potentially a powerful argument to leave the current constitutional understanding of immigration law intact. 168 However, precedential age as a justification of
the legal status quo has its limits. As Justice Douglas noted:
Precedents are made or unmade not on logic and history alone
.... We can get from those who preceded a sense of the continuity of a society. We can draw from their learning a feel for
the durability of a doctrine and a sense of the origins of principles. But we have experience that they never knew. Our vision
may be shorter or longer. But it is ours. It is better that we
make our own history than be governed by the dead. 6 9

At times, stability, reliance or "rule of law" interests in upholding a
precedent may pale beside that decision's current evil effects. 170 In
such circumstances, for a court, particularly the Supreme Court, to
uphold a precedent because of its age cuts against these interests;
such a course smacks of an unprincipled willingness to submit to
the rule of the dead rather than to address the requirements of the
rule of law.
167. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 865 ("The Court must take care to speak and act in ways
that allow people to accept its decisions on the terms the Court claims for them, as
grounded truly in principle, not as compromises with social and political pressures
....
"). Political pressure is all too evident in many of the Court's leading immigration
decisions, from the widespread anti-Chinese feeling preceding The Chinese Exclusion
Case (Chae Chan Ping v. United States), 130 U.S. 581 (1889), to the anti-Communist
hysteria of the McCarthy era, overshadowing Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel.
Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953), Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 580 (1952), and their
progeny, and finally to recent popular and governmental exasperation at the number
of refugees arriving from Cuba and Haiti, reflected in Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council,
Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 161 (1993), Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985), and other cases.
168. The immigration plenary power doctrine's age as the means of its precedential
support is so psychologically significant that scholars note its anniversaries. See, e.g.
Hiroshi Motomura, Phantom Norms, supra note 23; Henkin, A Century of Chinese
Exclusion, supra note 31.
169. Douglas, Stare Decisis, supra note 157, at 739.
170. See id. at 746-49. Justice Douglas considered reexamination of doctrine to be a
"healthy practice" and felt that respect for any court increased with its willingness to
admit error. Id. at 746-47. He also noted that the Court often repeatedly distinguishes
a precedent from the case at hand before finally deciding that it must overrule the
precedent, which may now have little practical effect. Id. at 747. "[T]his gradual process of erosion of constitutional doctrine ... has the true unsettling effect." Id. at 749.
See also CARDOZO, supra note 158, at 150-52 (when rules tested by experience are
inconsistent with justice or social welfare, courts should be less hesitant in striking
them down).
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Notwithstanding these considerations, the Supreme Court has

often considered the great age of the immigration plenary power
doctrine to be its most salient virtue.' 7' Since the precedents involved are one hundred years old, stare decisis in and of itself now
suffices to maintain the immigration plenary power doctrine, and
debate on the merits ends before it starts. 172 In other areas of law,

however, the Court has not gotten away so easily. The doctrinal
struggle over whether the Fourteenth Amendment "incorporates"
provisions of the Bill of Rights against the states 173 provides a striking demonstration of the failure of doctrinal age as an independent
stare decisis ground. The Supreme Court's 1954 dictum in Galvan
v. Press174 that "much could be said" in favor of placing constitutional limitations on the immigration plenary power "were we writ171. In light of the expansion of the concept of substantive due process as a
limitation upon all powers of Congress, even the war power, much could be
said for the view, were we writing on a clean slate, that the Due Process
Clause qualifies the scope of political discretion heretofore recognized as
belonging to Congress in regulating the entry and deportation of aliens ....
But the slate is not clean. As to the extent of the power of Congress under
review, there is not merely "a page of history," but a whole volume.
Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530-31 (1954) (citations omitted).
172. Id.; see also Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972).
173. The course of the "incorporation" debate, through which the Supreme Court
eventually held most of the first eight constitutional amendments' guarantees applicable against the states, ran roughly as follows. In 1833, the Court ruled that the Fifth
Amendment, and by implication the rest of the Bill of Rights, operated solely to limit
the federal government, as the Constitution as a whole delineated only the powers of
the federal government. Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
The Slaughter.House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), effectively rendered the
Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause a nullity, holding that the
clause included only the (limited) privileges and immunities of a citizen of the United
States, not those of a citizen of a state, and that the first eight amendments are not
"privileges or immunities" of a United States citizen. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S.
78 (1908), held that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause was equally
ineffective in applying the first eight amendments against the states.
Through a process of intense judicial debate too complex to describe at length in
this Note, the Fourteenth Amendment's DueProcess Clause finally won the day as a
mechanism to lend actual practical meaning to the Bill of Rights. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (Sixth Amendment right to jury trial); Washington v. Texas,
388 U.S. 14 (1967) (Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process to secure attendance of witnesses); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (Sixth Amendment
right to a speedy and public trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (Sixth
Amendment right to confrontation of opposing witnesses); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S.
1 (1964) (Fifth Amendment right not to be compelled to incriminate oneself); Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel);
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (Fourth Amendment right of freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, along with the exclusionary rule barring the use of evidence so obtained); and Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927) (First Amendment rights
to freedom of speech, press and religion).
174. 347 U.S. 522 (1954).
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ing on a clean slate" 175 eerily echoes its reasoning in 1908 in
Twining v. State of New Jersey,'1 7 6 that while "[m]uch might be said
in favor of the view that the privilege [against self-incrimination]
was guaranteed against state impairment ... the decisions of this
court have foreclosed that view.' 1 77 During the same period in
which it decided Galvan v. Press,the Court, facing advancing ideas
175. Id. at 530.
176. 211 U.S. 78 (1908). In ruling that the Fourteenth Amendment did not incorporate the Fifth Amendment protection against compulsory self-incrimination against
the states, the Court opined that "[miuch might be said in favor of the view that the
privilege [against self-incrimination] was guaranteed against state impairment as a
privilege and immunity of national citizenship, but... the decisions of this court have
foreclosed that view." Id. at 113. Furthermore, "[t]here seems to be no reason
whatever ...for straining the meaning of due process of law to include this privilege
within it .... Id. Sixty years later, in the midst of the series of opinions generally
known as the "Incorporation Cases," Justice Black, concurring in Duncan v. Louisiana, could refer to the "now discredited Twining doctrine." 391 U.S. 145, 167 (1968).
See generally Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (overruling Twining and holding the
privilege against self-incrimination incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause).
177. 211. U.S. at 113. This statement referred to guarantees through the Fourteenth
Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause, but in the very next sentence the
Court foreclosed incorporation through the Due Process Clause as well. The road
from Twining to incorporation was long and rocky, and the results only partially satisfying. The Court never consented to simply rule the Bill of Rights applicable against
the states, jot for jot, once and for all, as Justice Black argued had been the intent of
the Fourteenth Amendment's framers. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,
162-171 (1968) (Black, J., joined by Douglas, J., concurring) (explaining Justice
Black's theory of incorporation). Instead, the Court articulated a number of tests
centering on the notion of "fundamental fairness" in order to separate the constitutional sheep from the goats. Id. at 148-49. In order to avoid a troublesome redefinition of the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause, a
reading arguably closer to the amendment's framers' intent, infra, the Court resorted
to an awkward ballooning of the concept of "due process of law," incorporating the
protections necessary to "fundamental fairness" through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Supra, note 173.
The most recent scholarship strongly indicates that Justice Black has had the last
laugh in this debate, on the intent of the Fourteenth Amendment's framers if not
necessarily on his strict constructionist "jot-for-jot" application of that intent. See
generally Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the
Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863 (arguing on the basis of historical documents and statements that the Fourteenth Amendment's framers shared a
conception of the primacy of the federal government over the states and thus sought
to delegate ultimate authority for protecting and enforcing constitutional rights for all
citizens to the federal government and to define the Bill of Rights' protections as
"privileges or immunities of citizens of the U.S.," capable of federal enforcement
against the states). For a history of this vision's fate at the hands of the courts and
federal enforcement officials, see id. at 864-65 nn. 8-9, and see generally MICHAEL
CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL
OF RIGHTS (1986); ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI,THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 18661876 (1985). But see RAOUL BERGER, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE
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of justice and fairness, incorporated many Bill of Rights protections into its understanding of "due process of law" and applied
them against the states. 178 However, it refused to extend doctrinal
reexamination to its immigration rulings: the Court met its incorporation debate face to face in Galvan v. Press,'1 79 and simply
turned away.

The vast majority of immigration cases require for their resolution only the application of ordinary constitutional principles, as in
any other case arising under a federal law. 180 They are not nonjusticiable "political questions'

81

and they seldom involve a true

8
need for the Court to exercise prudential self-restraint.1 1
The Court states that it must speak and act so that the American

people will accept its decisions on the terms the Court claims for

those decisions, which must be "grounded truly in principle, not...
compromises with social and political pressures having, as such, no
bearing on the principled choices that the Court is obliged to

make."' 83 The Court has never applied this admirable principle to
its line of immigration opinions, and it does not presently seem inclined to do so. 184 Perhaps the sharply angled provisions of the

RIGHTS (1989) (arguing that framers did not intend to incorporate any of the
Bill of Rights' provisions against the states).
178. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see supra notes 173-77.
179. See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530-31 (1954), quoted supra, note 171.
180. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
181. See supra notes 143-55 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 156-63 and accompanying text.
183. Casey, 505 U.S. at 865-66. Cf Wechsler, supra note 144, at 12 ("The man who
simply lets his judgment turn on the immediate result may not, however, realize that
his position implies that the courts are free to function as a naked power organ, that it
is an empty affirmation to regard them, as ambivalently he so often does, as courts of
law."). See also THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
184. See, e.g., Summaries of Immigration Decisions in the Federal Courts, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 71, 74-75 (Jan. 16, 1996) ("[Tlhe Supreme Court in recent years
has not been prone to review decisions arising under the immigration and nationality
laws, even when the lower courts are in conflict on the issue .... "). In the context of
this statement, the article noted that the Solicitor General has requested certiorari in
one such issue, i.e., whether subsequent acts of fraud arising from an original fraudulent entry should count as separate adverse factors in certain discretionary relief determinations. Id. This strategy may indeed be effective, as the Court did grant
certiorari in the case. Yang v. INS, 58 F.3d 452 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. granted,116 S. Ct.
907, rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 350 (1996) (summarized in INS Asks Supreme Court to Review
Ninth Circuit'sConstruction of Fraud Waiver Statute, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 4445 (Jan. 10, 1996)). Whether an activist Solicitor General's office might obtain substantive review of immigration legislation where individual petitioners cannot is an
intriguing question.
BILL OF
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anti-terrorist bill 185 and recent immigration legislation'86 will goad
the Court to change its mind.
I11. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey: A Constitutional Framework for Abolishing the
Immigration Plenary Power Doctrine

Commentators have examined the Supreme Court's various rationales in support of the immigration plenary power doctrine and
found them unconvincing and without historical support or legal
justification. 187 However, the Court's own legal analysis has never

provided a basis for well-focused jurisprudential argument that
would lead it to abolish the immigration law plenary power doctrine as a failed legal theory.
Recently, however, in PlannedParenthoodof Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey 88 the Court set out in carefully considered and

authoritative terms the meaning and application of precedent and
stare decisis in its legal analyses. 189 In doing so, the Court provided
a framework by Which it could evaluate not only Roe v. Wade,190
the case called into question in Casey, but any other case involving
issues of precedent and stare decisis. 191

The Casey joint opinion, g2 intended beyond its narrow holding
as an authoritative judicial pronouncement on the nature of the

185. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
187. See, e.g., Motomura, Curious Evolution, supra note 111; Bates & Hake, supra
note 23 (examining the Supreme Court's contradictory findings that aliens within the
United States are entitled to due process in matters not concerning their right to enter
or remain in the United States, and that Congress may restrict due process rights at
will in the latter instance); Motomura, Phantom Norms, supra note 23 (examining the
federal courts' substitution of procedural due process findings for substantive constitutional determinations in recent years); Wani, supra note 114 (examining the increasingly heavy fictionalization of immigration law concepts as courts attempt to do
justice on particular facts); Edward M. Morgan, Aliens and Process Rights: The Open
and Shut Case of Legal Sovereignty, 7 Wis. INT'LL.. 107 (1988) (viewing the exclusion and deportation power in context of Canadian law); Henkin, A Century of Chinese Exclusion, supra note 31 (examining and criticizing the doctrinal bases involving
U.S. sovereignty that the Supreme Court has relied upon in immigration cases).
188. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
189. Id. at 843-69 (Parts 1,11 and III of the joint opinion). For critical perspectives
on whether the Court majority in fact accomplished its goal of enunciating such a
rational framework, see generally Gerhardt, supra note 157, and Maltz, supra note
157.
190. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
191. Casey, 505 U.S. at 854-55.
192. The term "joint opinion" refers to the opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy
and Souter, with which Justices Blackmun and Stevens separately concurred in part
and in the result, creating a working majority for the decision in Casey.
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Court's stare decisis considerations,193 set forth with clarity a
number of the Court's considerations for invoking stare decisis and
for weighing the relative costs of overruling or reconfirming a case
or line of cases. These considerations include, in the order in which
the Court presented them, (i) whether the holding at issue defies
practical workability; 194 (ii) whether people and entities have come
to rely so heavily on the existence of a holding that hardship would
ensue should the holding be overruled; 195 (iii) whether related
principles of law have developed so that the rule in question is now
a remnant of an abandoned doctrine; 196 and (iv) whether the facts
which surrounded that holding have so changed, or have come to
be seen so differently, that the old rule is robbed of any significant
application or justification. 197 The joint opinion further described
the special prudential considerations which the Court must take
into account when it reconsiders a ruling 1on
a nationally controver98
sial and divisive issue, such as abortion.
The joint opinion supported these considerations by citing the
need for a fair decision-making process and freedom from governmental and judicial arbitrariness. 199 These concepts, the joint opinion writers noted, are inherent in the American idea of the rule of
law and are essential to the Court's legitimacy to play its constitutional role.2"' The Court reasoned that the American people must
be able to accept its decisions on the grounds stated for them and
that therefore the Court must decide cases on a principled basis
and not through political or social pressure.20 ' While by no means
193. Justice Souter took the "unprecedented" course of announcing orally from the
bench that "[t]o overrule [Roe v. Wade] would subvert the Court's legitimacy beyond
any reasonable question. If the Court were undermined, the country would also be
so." Gerhardt, supra note 157, at 75. The Court itself felt it was addressing the nation
to constitutionally resolve an intensely divisive issue in a manner it had used only
twice in recent history: once in 1954 in Brown v. Board of Educ. and once when
announcing Roe v. Wade itself. Casey, 505 U.S. at 866.
194. 505 U.S. at 854.
195. Id. at 854-55, also expressed as a "reliance" doctrine analogous to that at contract. See id. at 956-57 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
196. Id. at 855.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 861-71.
199. Casey, 505 U.S. at 865-66.
200. Id.
201. Id. This reasoning is important in reconsidering the Court's line of immigration decisions, many of which appear to be based squarely on political and social
pressure. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 798 (1977) ("With respect to ...these
legislative policy distinctions [between legitimate and illegitimate children], it could
be argued that the line should have been drawn at a different point and that the
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intended as a factored or a multi-pronged test, the joint opinion's
precedential analysis provides a useful framework for reexamining
the doctrinal underpinnings of the Court's immigration jurisprudence, particularly the immigration plenary power doctrine.
A.

Is the Immigration Plenary Power Doctrine Unworkable?

The Casey joint opinion dealt briefly with the practical workability of the Roe holding before it, finding Roe "a simple limitation

beyond which a state law is unenforceable" and not prone to arbitrary interpretation. °2 Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority,20 3 a leading case which the joint opinion cited in finding
Roe workable, defines "practical unworkability" as the impossibility of applying the ruling other than by judicial fiat, and the ruling's
own inability to accommodate changing circumstances.0 4
statutory definitions deny preferential status to parents and children who share strong
family ties."). The Court did not address whether the Constitution in fact requiredthe
line to be drawn at another point. See also Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770
(1972) ("We hold that when the Executive exercises this power [to exclude an alien
from the United States] ...on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason,

the courts will neither look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification against the First Amendment interests of those who seek personal communication with the applicant."); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel.
Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 215 (1953) (despite returning resident status of Mezei and presence of U.S. citizen immediate family members whom he could not rejoin, "we do not
think that respondent's continued exclusion deprives him of any statutory or constitutional right"); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 597 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (ignoring Court's historical responsibility to invalidate unconstitutional
legislation, "whether immigration laws have been crude and cruel, whether they may
have reflected xenophobia in general or anti-Semitism or anti-Catholicism, the responsibility belongs to Congress"); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338
U.S. 537, 544 (1950) ("Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due
process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned."); The Chinese Exclusion Case
(Chae Chan Ping v. United States), 130 U.S. 581, 595 (1889) (indicating as part of the
factual background the "differences of race" between Chinese immigrants and white
U.S. citizens; that the Chinese "remained strangers in the land" that "[i]t seemed impossible for them to assimilate with our people;" and that China's large population
led to the possibility that the West Coast "would be overrun by them unless prompt
action was taken to restrict their immigration").
202. Casey, 505 U.S. at 855.
203. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
204. Casey, 505 U.S. at 855. Garcia considered whether the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19, could be validly enforced against the San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority (SAMTA). To escape FLSA regulation, SAMTA had
to show either that its activities did not affect interstate commerce (a proposition for
which it did not try to argue), 469 U.S. at 537, or that its activities were a traditional
state government function which the federal government, acting under the Commerce
Clause as it did in enacting the FLSA, could not reach (the argument it made before
the Court), id. at 537-38.
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The Casey joint opinion found that while state and federal courts
would have to continue to assess state laws regulating the right to

an abortion-a requirement the Casey ruling would not changesuch review was within judicial competence. °5 Moreover, the joint
opinion found, Roe's central holding was not prone to arbitrariness
of application, and that Roe's doctrinal framework allowed for necessary flexibility of interpretation. 0 6

In contrast, immigration law is notoriously complex, and judges
find interpreting immigration statutory and case law extremely
frustrating.0 7 Furthermore, the lower courts' attempts to interpret

and employ immigration law's many legal fictions lead straight to
the Garcia evils of arbitrary application of the law, through lack of

any discernible organizing principle, 20 8 and doctrinal fossilization.20 9 In consequence, practically every immigration case beIn ruling that enforcing the FLSA against SAMTA did not exceed the scope of the
Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3, the Court rejected the "traditional
government functions" test it had established in National League of Cities v. Usery,
426 U.S. 833 (1976). Upon reviewing lower courts' attempts to apply the test, the
Court concluded that the test was unworkable because any possible approach to it
would be arbitary, requiring courts to decide by fiat which governmental functions
were "traditional" enough to be exempt from the FLSA, and that the test could not
accommodate changing circumstances, e.g., the radically increased state role in the
once privately run education system. 469 U.S. at 545-46.
205. Casey, 505 U.S. at 855.
206. Id.
207. United States Circuit Court Judge Irving Kaufman wrote in one opinion, "We
have had the occasion to note the striking resemblance between some of the [immigration] laws we are called upon to interpret and King Minos' labyrinth in ancient
Crete. The Tax Laws and the Immigration and Nationality Acts are examples we have
cited of Congress's ingenuity in passing statutes certain to accelerate the aging process
of judges." Lok v. INS, 548 F.2d 37, 38 (2d Cir. 1977). While there is little the judiciary can do in such a situation unless a statute is so incomprehensible as to violate due
process norms, it could at least call a halt to its own fictional embellishments on immigration law's statutory edifice.
208. The Court in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S.
528, 538-39 (1985), in discussing cases decided in light of its holding in National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), noted:
We find it difficult, if not impossible, to identify an organizing principle that
places each of the cases in the first group [holding various state activities to
be "essential government functions" immune from federal regulation] on
one side of a line and each of the cases in the second group [in which the
federal courts held other state government activities susceptible to federal
regulation] on the other side. The constitutional distinction between licensing drivers and regulating traffic, for example, or between operating a highway authority and operating a mental health facility, is elusive at best.
209. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 543-44 ("The most obvious defect of a historical approach
to state immunity is that it prevents a court from accommodating changes in the historical function of a state, changes that have resulted in a number of once-private
functions like education being assumed by the States and their subdivisions."). See
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comes a hard case, and at times these cases make exceedingly bad
law.21o
History has been another victim of the Court's attempts to create workable doctrinal supports for the immigration plenary power
doctrine. For instance, the Supreme Court in The Chinese Exclusion Case formally acknowledged that in the framers' view sover-

eignty lay in the people, not in the federal government.2 ' To get
around the contradiction between a sovereign people and sovereign powers that the government simply arrogates to itself, the
Court distinguished external affairs, which the nation faces as a unitary entity, finding the federal government alone "sovereign" for

this purpose.21 2 In applying this distinction, the Court had little
sense of proportion; it did not give any convincing reason (unless
one counts the "encroaching horde" theory21 3) why the full might
of an otherwise unrecognized federal sovereignty should need to be
directed at the hapless alien.21 4

Furthermore, the Court's hegemonic, extraconstitutional view of
external affairs sovereignty does not concur with the framers' vialso id. at 557 ("Attempts by other courts .

.

. to draw guidance from [the Usery

model] have proved it both impracticable and doctrinally barren."). Cf. Wani, supra
note 114, at 53 ("Fictions are more pervasive, insidious and entrenched in immigration law than in other legal areas. Where other fictions shift and reform to accommodate changing views, century old fictions still rule immigration law.").
210. "[Hlard cases make bad law." Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193
U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
211. 130 U.S. at 604.
212. Id. at 606; see Wani, supra note 114, at 67.
213. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 594-96. The Court's "horde" rationale combined elements of protectionism (competition with native-born workers and
artisans) and xenophobia (e.g., "differences of race," "strangers in the land," "impossible ... to assimilate," and "danger... that portion of our country would be overrun
by them," id. at 595). See also Wani, supra note 114, at 76 ("the Court does not point
to a single instance of a threat arising from these numbers [of immigrating Chinese],
nor does it explain how they would threaten national security or why available constitutional powers would not suffice").
214. See Wani, supra note 114, at 76 (noting difficulty of imagining an immigration
crisis so severe that total concentration of unbounded government power would be
required to combat it, when the Constitution's framers denied the power for such a
concentration even in a time of direct military attack). The rights of the individual
facing the monolithic U.S. sovereign power may actually have decreased since the
founding. See Louis

HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY AND FOREIGN AF-

93-94 (1990) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONALISM] ("Nothing in the framers' conception of rights suggested that respect for individual rights should be less or different
in the conduct of the foreign relations of the new republic;" in the following 200 years
the evolution of individual rights jurisprudence lessened individual rights in the foreign affairs context).
FAIRS
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sion of the Constitution's reach in foreign affairs.2 15 Nor does the
clash of hegemonic sovereignties on a world scale which underlies
the Court's immigration rulings validly apply to the present-day vi-

sion of international relations requiring cooperation, international
law, and intergovernmental organizations having at least some
power to dictate rules of international behavior.216 Rather, the
Supreme Court created its notion of sovereignty both to support a
desired result in the Chinese Exclusion Case and to obviate the

need 217 to find a textual constitutional home for the immigration
regulatory authority.21 8

In common-sense terms, it is completely reasonable to imply a
federal power to regulate immigration, as the fifty states' separate
attempts to regulate entry into the United States would surely lead
to chaos.21 9 However, the American constitutional tradition provides no basis for the Court's false notion of American "sover215. See Henkin,

CONSTITUTIONALISM,

supra note 214, at 99-100 (noting with ap-

proval Justice Black's argument that the framers conceived of the rights of man everywhere, not simply within the United States); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 17 (1957).
216. See Wani, supra note 114, at 69 ("[T]he very idea of international law seems
inconsistent with such a concept [of absolute sovereignty]."). Wani points to several
examples of international institutions which can function only if sovereignties cooperate (thereby necessarily ceding a portion of their absoluteness) including the Permanent Court of International Justice, the Nuremburg tribunal, and the existence of jus
cogens, the doctrine that the world community considers certain values to be so fundamental that these values preempt state powers. Id. at 69-70. Today, nations may
even have constitutional provisions allowing delegation of sovereign powers to international bodies, such as the United Nations or the European Union. See GEORGE A.
BERMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN UNION LAW (1993), at 21314 (quoting and describing provisions of the constitution of the Netherlands), 216
(Germany), 228-30 (Italy), 231 (Denmark and Ireland), 242 n.6 (Greece, Portugal and
Spain). While the constitutional provisions differ in scope and on whether parliamentary action is required to transfer aspects of sovereignty to supranational bodies, all of
these nations recognize some level of direct effect in the national legal order for at
least some variety of international law. Furthermore, all of the European Union
member states necessarily recognize the supremacy of E.U. law over conflicting national laws as well as the direct effect of certain E.U. treaty provisions and legislation
in the national legal order. Id. at 166-203.
217. See Henkin, A Century of Chinese Exclusion, supra note 31, at 857 (describing
Supreme Court efforts to define and place an authority to regulate immigration within
the Constitution).
218. Most notably, the Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884), attempted to fit the
federal power to regulate immigration into the commerce power. See Henkin, A Century of Chinese Exclusion, supra note 31, at 856.
219. See JAMES H. KE-INER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP,
1608-1970 at 224-25 (1978) (naturalization power delegated to Congress in order to
avoid controversy of separate attempts to define citizenship); see also Henkin, A Century of Chinese Exclusion, supra note 31, at 856.
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eignty" used to strip immigration legislation of judicial review. 2 °
No foreign affairs-related need for national unity compels such an
anti-constitutional result, and this hegemonic view of sovereignty
contradicts both the framers' underlying conception of the nature
of the United States and present-day international realities.221 The

fossilized, century-old concept of an absolute plenary power, inherent in sovereignty, to regulate immigration does not accord with
reality and thus has become "intolerable simply in defying practical
workability. "222
B. Reliance Interests in the Plenary Power Precedent

At the heart of the Casey joint opinion lies the question of
whether affected parties, mainly women, so rely upon the existence

of legal abortion that the cost should the Court repudiate Roe v.
Wade would be unacceptably high.223 The joint opinion writers
found that in the abortion context, "the liberty of the woman is at
stake in a sense unique to the human condition and so unique to
220. See Wani, supra note 114, at 75-78. Professor Wani notes that "absolute sovereignty is generally associated with despotism, while progressive demands for liberalism and political rights are generally based on a conception of limited government."
Id. at 75. Additionally, he sees little support in either logic or constitutional history
for a broader version of sovereignty for immigration or foreign affairs than for any
other area of national concern. Id. at 77. See also Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 58
(1958) ("The restrictions confining Congress in the exercise of any of the powers expressly delegated to it in the Constitution apply with equal vigor when that body
seeks to regulate our relations with other nations.").
Even as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, the power to regulate immigration
should not escape constitutional review. See HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra
note 214, at 98-99 ("there is nothing to suggest that constitutional restrictions apply
with less vigor when Congress (or the excutive) acts under powers not expressly delegated by the framers but which the Court later found to be inherent in the international sovereignty of the United States"). Nor does the Court regard inherent powers
very highly at present. Professor Wani notes that since United States v. CurtissWright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936), "[n]o Supreme Court decision has accepted
inherent (extraconstitutional) powers as the sole basis for executive power[ ]." Wani,
supra note 114, at 77 n.136. The inherent power rationale maintains strength in immigration law because the age of the precedents has become the major reason for their
survival. See supra part II.B.
221. See, e.g.,

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

§ 721 (1987) ("The provisions of the United States Constitution safeguarding
individual rights generally control the United States government in the conduct of its
foreign relations as well as in domestic matters, and generally limit governmental authority whether it is exercised in the United States or abroad, and whether such authority is exercised unilaterally or by international agreement."). See also supra note
155.
222. Casey, 505 U.S. at 854 (citing Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 116
(1965)).
223. Id. at 855-56.
STATES
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the law, '22 4 and that the people's sharply differing and strongly
held views on the abortion question involve questions of personal
liberty best left to individuals.225
Within our constitutional framework of enumerated and delegated powers,226 there can be no legitimate reliance on Congress's
exercise of an extraconstitutional power. 2 7 Such reliance licenses

the arbitrary and liberty-restricting exercise of an extraconstitutional, unreviewable power on behalf of one or another aggrieved

faction, such as the victims of economic downturns, sections of the
population holding nativist beliefs or those simply desiring a designated scapegoat, 228 and is thus inconsistent with our conceptions of
fundamental fairness and of the rule of law. 22 9 Furthermore, to
countenance the existence of such an extraconstitutional power

strikes at the Supreme Court's own legitimacy as interpreter of the
Constitution.2 30 Finally, many Americans, as well as visitors and
immigrants to this country, find the immigration laws at best
counterintuitive23 1 and at times horribly cruel.232 It is doubtful, for
224. Id. at 852.
225. Id.
226. See supra part III.A.
227. See supra notes 18-21, 217-21 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional
limits on the exercise of legislative power and the contradictory nature of the immigration law plenary power doctrine within that framework).
228. See Lennon v. INS, 527 F.2d 187, 189 (2d Cir. 1975) (noting that immigration
law is "a magic mirror, reflecting the fears and concerns of past Congresses"); Schuck,
supra note 5, at 2 (character of immigration law reflects "more fundamental social
and ideological structures").
229. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (urging the proposed
constitutional structure as a means of dampening the undesirable effects of factional
struggle).
230. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 865-66; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177
("It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is."). See also infra, part III.E (discussing consideration of Court's legitimacy,
inter alia, as a prudential consideration of the Court when it rules on a matter of
precedent).
231. See, e.g., Hart, supra note 139, at 1389-96 (discussing seemingly inconsistent
results of applying the former "entry doctrine"); see also supra note 133 (explaining
the still-bizarre results of IIRIRA's redefinition of the "entry" concept).
232. See supra,note 3 and accompanying text (describing plight of longtime permanent resident detained pending deportation just short of swearing in as citizen). See
also Celia W. Dugger, Woman's Plea for Asylum Puts Tribal Ritual on Trial, N.Y.
TIMES, April 15, 1996, at Al [hereinafter Woman's Pleafor Asylum (describing twoyear detention, including in maximum security prison, of Fauziya Kassindja (whose
name immigration officials at first misspelled as "Kasinga"), a teenaged girl who fled
Togo to avoid forced genital mutilation and arranged marriage). Ms. Kassindja told
the reporter, "I keep asking myself, 'What did I do to deserve such punishment?
What did I do?"' Id. Apparently, many Americans had the same question; after widespread public outcry, Ms. Kassindja was released on parole pending the Board of
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example, that many Americans would feel that permanently banishing a long-time lawful permanent resident one day short of being sworn in as a U.S., citizen accords with any notion of
fundamental fairness. 2 33 Abolishing the immigration law plenary
power doctrine in favor of immigration regulation following constitutional norms would further both the interests of fundamental
fairness and the federal courts' legitimacy in the constitutional
framework, while refraining from this step will generate ever-in-

creasing costs to the rule of law through the courts' tolerance of
illegitimate factional reliance on an extraconstitutional (and therefore illegitimate) exercise of legislative power.
C. Evolution of Legal Principles Weakens Doctrinal Footings
The Casey joint opinion gave particular attention to the doctrinal
strength of the principles under its review. It examined the consti2 34
tutional doctrines and legal principles underlying Roe v. Wade
and concluded that further developments in constitutional law had
not left these principles behind.235 Lower courts would not go
astray through applying Roe's principles in the abortion or other

Immigration Appeals decision which approved her asylum case. In re Kasinga, Int.
Dec. 3278 (BIA 1996); see Celia W. Dugger, U.S. Grants Asylum to Woman Fleeing
Genital Mutilation Rite, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1996, at Al. See also Solomon, supra
note 139 (interviewing detainees at various facilities and their friends and relatives
who express bewilderment over immigration laws and their apparent punishment for
seeking asylum).
Furthermore, immigration detainees at most prison facilities must wear prison
uniforms, are shackled hand and foot for transport to visiting hours, hearings and
other facilities, and are at times subject to the same strip and body cavity searches as
convicted criminals following visits, vastly heightening the punitive nature of their
detention. See Dugger, Woman's Plea for Asylum, supra; Solomon, supra note 139.
Since this detention is not legally considered "punishment," the Eighth Amendment
does not apply to detention conditions, which often fail to meet established standards
for correctional facilities. See Solomon, supra note 139, at 26.
233. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (describing circumstances of one casualty of the recently enacted Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act); see also
AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), described supra, notes 6-9 and
accompanying text.
234. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
235. Casey, 505 U.S. at 857-59.
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contexts,2 36 including newly arising problems, 2 37 and could apply
238
these principles neutrally.
The Supreme Court sought textual support 239 in the Constitution
for its privacy rulings, including Griswold v. Connecticut,240 Roe v.
Wade241 and their progeny, although it faced constitutional silence

on the privacy issue per se. 242 It did not invent a fictional, extraConstitutional source of the privacy interest as it had invented a
fictional attribute of sovereignty seventy years earlier in the first
immigration cases.243 In fact, the Casey majority noted three sepa-

rate doctrinal lines of reasoning that would constitutionally uphold
Roe, giving the decision strong support from several lines of
approach.24
236. Id.
237. Id. at 857 (Roe created a rule, mistaken or not, of bodily integrity and personal
autonomy and accords with later cases finding that state interests could not override
individual liberty claims in a plenary fashion where bodily integrity and/or'personal
autonomy were concerned).
238. Id. at 859 (noting that the recognition in Roe of a woman's interest in deciding
whether to bear a child equally bars the state from forcing termination of pregnancy).
239. In writing for the Griswold majority, Justice Douglas cited the Ninth Amendment, but based the Court's holding on "penumbras" and "emanations" of the First,
Third, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 482-85 (1965). The "penumbras" and "emanations" from the Constitution's text
on which Justice Douglas based much of Griswold may not seem very convincing
given the Court's present textualist and historicist/originalist bent. See, e.g., id.
(enumerating case law extending by penumbra and emanation the textual understanding of the First, Ninth, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments). In Justice
Douglas's defense, however, the sheer number of already recognized penumbras and
emanations from various constitutional provisions that he was able to find underscores the vitality of Griswold's theory of personal liberty.
Notably, Justice Douglas stated in Griswold that "[w]e deal with a right of privacy
older than the Bill of Rights." Id. at 486. However, unlike writers for the Court in its
immigration holdings, he did not use that perception to place the privacy right outside
the Constitution altogether - in fact, in examining the case law noted above, he did
just the opposite, seeking to constitutionalize it more firmly. Id. at 483-85.
240. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
241. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
242. The closest candidate is the Ninth Amendment, which provides that "The
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend IX. However, the
Court has never authoritatively interpreted the Ninth Amendment to include a retained right of privacy. See generally Symposium on Interpreting the Ninth Amendment, 64 CmI.-KETr L. REv. 37 (1988).
243. The Chinese Exclusion Case (Chae Chan Ping v. United States), 130 U.S. 581,
604-06 (1889); see supra notes 130-132 and accompanying text.
244. Casey, 505 U.S. at 857-58. The joint opinion noted that the Roe Court had
based itself on the protected liberty interest relating to intimate relationships expressed in Griswold,noting that Griswold's progeny had not disturbed its basic holding. Casey, 505 U.S. at 857. The joint opinion further indicated Roe's "doctrinal
affinity to cases recognizing limits on governmental power to mandate medical treat-
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In contrast, the Court's immigration rulings from The Chinese
Exclusion Case forward do not attempt to cite any firm constitutional roots; rather, the Court justifies its decisions in terms of
themselves, citing to them layer upon layer, until their very age
becomes their greatest virtue. 45 Instead of undertaking fresh evaluation of the immigration plenary power doctrine's underlying
principles, the Court left immigration law "blissfully untouched"

through the virtual revolution in constitutional law which has taken
place since the 1950s.2 46
D.

Underlying Facts Have Changed or Are Seen Differently

The Casey joint opinion 247 extensively explored the effect of
changes in the facts underlying a legal issue-whether these facts
are scientific, such as the gestation period for fetal viability,248 or
interpretive, such as the Court's view of the economic rights of employers in the context of workplace safety and wages and hours
laws.249 The Court noted that not only had the facts (or at least the
ment or to bar its rejection," noting that personal autonomy and bodily integrity cases
since Roe had themselves accorded with Roe's views on these matters. Id. Finally, in
a much less convincing argument, the joint opinion noted that even if Roe had to
stand on its own doctrinal feet, majorities of the Court had upheld its central principles regularly since the case was decided. Id. at 858.
245. See supra part II.B.
246. Aleinikoff, FederalRegulation of Aliens, supra note 67, at 865 (citing developments in due process, equal protection and the rights/privileges distinction in the conferral of government acts or benefits which have passed by immigration law doctrines
affecting these areas); see also Henkin, A Century of Chinese Exclusion, supra note
31, at 860-61. It is interesting to note that the Warren Court, which broke much constitutional ground in due process and equal protection in particular, could not do the
same for immigration law. Chief Justice Warren, along with Justices Douglas, Black,
and sometimes Frankfurter or Jackson, dissented, often vehemently, from the usually
5-4 or 6-3 rulings of the Court in immigration cases. After Justice Brennan joined the
Court, he too became a frequent dissenter in immigration cases.
247. Casey, 505 U.S. at 858-66.
248. Id. at 860 (noting advances in maternal health care increasing late-term abortion safety as well as advances in neonatal care allowing survival from an earlier stage
of pregnancy, approximately 23 to 24 weeks).
249. Id. at 861-63. The Court compared previous Courts' changing views of economic facts and circumstances from Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating maximum hours law as infringement of employers' substantive due process
rights and thus rendering most government regulation of the economy unconstitutional) to West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (overruling Adkins v.
Children's Hosp. of D.C., 261 U.S. 525 (1923), which had invalidated a minimum
wage, and implicitly overruling Lochner), as well as its changing views of racial equality from Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding that legally racially segregated accommodations could still be equal for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment) to Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that segregated educational facilities were ipso facto unequal).
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Court's view of them) underlying these issues changed, but the issues themselves were momentous in American history.250 Immigration, which in large part defines Americans both to
themselves 251 and to the rest of the world,252 is another such momentous issue and equally deserves the Court's

searching

reevaluation.
Interestingly, in a footnote to his concurring opinion in Casey,
Justice Stevens chose to compare the state interest in protecting
potential life in the abortion context to the "state interest in protecting those who seek to immigrate to this country, '253 such as

Haitian refugees in their "desperate attempt to become 'persons'
protected by our laws. ' 254 He then opined that "[h]umanitarian
and practical concerns would support a state policy allowing those
persons unrestricted entry; countervailing interests in population

control support a policy of limiting the entry of these potential
citizens. "255
250. Casey, 505 U.S. at 861 (discussing the need for additional analysis above and
beyond the ordinary where such issues are involved).
251. The concept of the United States as a "nation of immigrants" gets frequent
play in the press and in politics. See, e.g., Suzanne Fields, We're a Nation of Immigrants Now and Forever,TIMES-UNION (Albany), Nov. 21, 1996, at A15 (describing a
day at the Statue of Liberty and Ellis Island monuments); A Nation of Immigrants
Whose Blood Is American, HoUsToN CHRON., Nov. 11, 1996, at 22 (Veterans Day
editorial praising contributions of immigrant soldiers); Immigrant War Heros, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 11, 1996, at A16 (same). Both President Clinton and Bob Dole invoked
the metaphor during the presidential campaign, despite having spent the previous
year in Congress and the White House passing and signing restrictive immigration
legislation. See, e.g., M2 Presswire, The White House: Remarks to the People of the El
Paso Area, 1996 WL 13550299 (Nov. 8, 1996) (transcript of a campaign speech); M2
Presswire, Remarks by the President to the Colorado Democratic Coordinated Campaign and the African American Initiative of Colorado, 1996 WL 13549287 (Nov. 7,
1996) (same); John Marelius, Dole Tosses Script, Goes After Clinton, SAN DIEGO
UNIoN-TRIB., Oct. 27, 1996, at Al (quoting Bob Dole invoking the "nation of immigrants" image at a campaign rally); All Things Considered, seg. no. 16, show no. 2306,
1996 WL 12726300 (NPR broadcast, Aug. 15, 1996) (Jack Kemp's acceptance speech
for the Republican vice-presidential nomination, invoking image of "nation of immigrants"). The Immigration and Naturalization Service even invoked the metaphor of
a nation of immigrants as it announced that in fiscal 1995 it had deported a record
number of them. Janet Hook, INS Deported a Record 67,000, Report States, L.A.
TIMES,

Oct. 28, 1996, at Al.

252. E.g., the Statue of Liberty, with its famous poem, The New Colossus, by Emma
Lazarus ("Give me your tired, your poor .... "), is instantly recognizable worldwide
as a welcoming symbol of the United States.
253. Casey, 505 U.S. at 915 n.3 (Stevens, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
254. Id.
255. Id.
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On the other hand, "while the state interest in population control might be sufficient to justify strict enforcement of the immigration laws, that interest would not be sufficient to overcome a
woman's liberty interest. Thus, a state interest in population control could not justify a state-imposed limit on family size.... 56

Unfortunately, a year later Justice Stevens, writing for an 8-1
majority, held that the U.S. government could interdict the Haitian
refugee subjects of his Casey footnote at sea and return them summarily to Haiti. 57 The state's "countervailing interests in population control ' 258 has won the balance, at least for the moment.
Haitian refugees (who are only "attempt[ing] to become 'persons'
protected by our laws

'259)

are legally worse off than pre-viable fe-

protuses, which are not "persons 2 60 but which the Constitution
2 61
tects from any "state interest in population control."
Perhaps, however, Justice Stevens's musings do indicate some
262
readiness to see the facts underlying immigration law differently.
The Court could even begin by concluding that no governmental

interest in "population control" is sufficient by- itself to overcome
an individual's liberty interest under the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendment. Congress would then have to formulate an immigration policy in accord with the Constitution, a policy which accounts
for the liberty and other constitutionally protected interests that

256. Id. This statement is particularly ironic in light of the treatment meted out to
the Chinese refugees who arrived on the Golden Venture, many of whom made asylum claims based on opposition to China's mandatory one child per family policy.
Many of them waited for over three years in Pennsylvania's York County Jail and
other facilities for their claims to be heard, and the U.S. government admitted that it
had instituted a mandatory detention policy for Chinese refugees as a cautionary measure to any others who might consider risking the trip to the United States. Court
Orders INS to Consider PRC Nationals.for Parole From Detention, 72 INTERPRETER
RELEASES

417, 418 (Mar. 27, 1995).

257. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993). Justice Blackmun
dissented.
258. Casey, 505 U.S. at 915 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
259. Id.
260. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 913-14 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the status of fetuses under the Fourteenth Amendment).
261. Id. at 915 n.3.
262. The Casey joint opinion recognized this aspect of factual change as part of the
Court's prudential and pragmatic evaluation of a given precedent. 505 U.S. at 855
("whether facts have so changed or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed
the old rule of significant application or justification").
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accrue when any person is the subject of U.S. government
action.263
E.

The Supreme Court's Prudential Considerations

The Casey joint opinion examined the Court's prudential considerations when ruling on matters of precedent. 264 The legitimacy of
the courts, and especially the Supreme Court, is shown through the
"people's acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to determine what the
Nation's law means and to declare what it demands. ' 265 This ac-

ceptance is the sole Source of the Court's power, as it can neither
buy nor directly coerce support and obedience.266
Special, heightened prudential considerations attach when the
Court decides a case in order toresolve an intensely divisive national controversy such as the legality of abortion.2 67 A wrong conclusion would not only be an unjustifiable (albeit later reversible)
result, but a serious weakening of the Court's capacity to function
as the upholder of the rule of law.268 The more errors and flipflops the Court makes, the more acceptance of and respect for its
rulings declines. 269 When the Court's rulings create disrespect

within the lower courts, the legislature and the people, however; it
must consider carefully whether advancing legal and social ideas
have overtaken its prior line of decisions. 270

263. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 39, § 5-16 at 361 (noting of the immigration regulation power that "[t]he traditional international perspective, that internal limits on the
powers of national governments are without significance to foreign affairs, is ultimately unrealistic and cannot be the perspective, of the Constitution. Yet it.
is the
Constitution that is the lens through which American government must judge its authority ....
").
264. Casey, 505 U.S. at 860-69. The joint opinion writers noted and described the
fates of two lines of. cases prior to Roe v. Wade that involved comparable national
controversies. The first was Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (effectively
adopting laissez-faire economic theory through substantive due process concept of
"liberty of contract"); the second, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (ruling that
"separate but equal" status of races accords with Fourteenth Amendment proscription of race-based deprivation of equal protection of the laws). The joint opinion
noted both the arguable wrongness from the beginning of the opinions in these cases
and the changed factual situation underlying them. Casey, 505 U.S. at 861-64.
265. Casey, 505 U.S. at 865.
266. Id.; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
267. Casey, 505 U.S. at 866-67.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 866 ("There is... a point beyond which frequent overruling would overtax the country's belief in the Court's good faith.... The legitimacy of the Court
would fade with the frequency of its vacillation.").
270. The Casey dissenters (Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices White, Scalia
and Thomas) particularly stressed this aspect of stare decisis analysis. 505 U.S. at 95366. They argued that Roe should be overruled outright and that in fact the majority
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Both the enforcement 27 ' and judicial interpretation 272 of the

United States' immigration laws have engendered this very disrespect. Since the earliest days of the Republic the Court has insisted

that "no Act of Congress can authorize a violation of the Constitution. '2 73 Yet the government has argued almost since the Supreme
had managed to accomplish much of this end sub rosa. Id. at 953-57. The dissenters
argued (not without cause) that the majority's "undue burden" standard for evaluating abortion regulations had left Roe an empty shell: "Roe continues to exist, but only
in the way a storefront on a western movie set exists: a mere facade to give the illusion of reality." Id. at 954. Indeed, if "[l]iberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of
doubt" as the first line of the joint opinion avers, id. at 844, a liberty-restricting "jurisprudence of doubt" is exactly what the "undue burden" test creates, as all now turns
upon what "undue" means to the court considering it.
Most important for jurisprudential analysis, however, is that neither side felt that a
given precedent's age, without more, was a proper reason for perpetuating it. This
view contrasts sharply with the Court's treatment of its immigration precedents.
Compare Casey, 505 U.S. at 955 ("Our constitutional watch does not cease merely
because we have spoken before on an issue; when it becomes clear that a prior constitutional interpretation is unsound we are obliged to reexamine the question.") (Rehnquist, C.J., with White, Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting) and id. at 864 ("In
constitutional adjudication as elsewhere in life, changed circumstances may impose
new obligations, and the thoughtful part of the Nation could accept each decision to
overrule a prior case as a response to the Court's constitutional duty.") (joint opinion
of O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter, JJ.) with Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530-31
(1954) ("[Miuch could be said for the view, were we writing on a clean slate, that the
Due Process Clause qualifies the scope of political discretion ... in regulating the
entry and deportation of aliens. But the slate is not clean.... [T]here is not merely 'a
page of history,' but a whole volume.") (citation omitted) and Kleindienst v. Mandel,
408 U.S. 753, 767 (1972) ("We are not inclined in the present context to reconsider
[the Galvan] line of cases."); accord Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 n.4 (1977) ("We
are no more inclined to reconsider [the Galvan] line of cases today than we were five
years ago when we decided Kleindienst v. Mandel.") (citation omitted).
271. See supra note 41 (describing popular resistance, often on religious grounds, to
enforcement efforts against Central American refugees and undocumented workers
during the 1980s).
272. The Government has often argued with a straight face before the Supreme
Court that immigration statutes are utterly and completely beyond Court review in all
respects. See, e.g., Wong Wing v. United States, 16 U.S. 228, 239 (1896) (Field, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I... dissent entirely from.., harsh and
illegal assertions, made by counsel to the government... as to the right of the court to
deny to the accused the full protection of the law and Constitution against every form
of oppression and cruelty to them."); McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., 498 U.S. 479,
491 (1991) (describing INS's presumption that its conduct would be unreviewable in
the courts, infra note 278); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 804-05 (1977) (Marshall and
Brennan, JJ., dissenting) ("The Government contends that this legislation is not subject to judicial review.... [Tihe Government concludes [in its brief to the Court] that
'[t]he congressional decision.., is not a subject of judicial review," a bald assertion
that even the majority in Fiallo rejected as too expansive).
273. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973). The Court reserved to itself the power to invalidate an unconstitutional act of Congress in Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), noting that "all those who have framed
written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount
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Court's earliest immigration rulings that Congress's power to legislate on immigration matters is completely, in all respects, outside
the limits of both the Constitution and judicial review.274 Despite

these challenges to the Constitution, the Court, and the rule of law
in general, the Supreme Court continues to countenance immigration legislation which would be unconstitutional by the Court's
law of the nation, and, consequently, the theory of every such government must be,
that an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void," and further that,
as it was "emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is," the judiciary, being also bound by the Constitution, must declare such
laws void or reduce the Constitution to a status no higher than that of any other law.
Id. at 177. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961):
The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the
courts. A constitution is... a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them
to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the two, that which has the superior obligation and
validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in other words, the Constitution
ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents.
The merits of the arguments for and against Chief Justice Marshall's famous proposition in Marbury are outside the scope of this Note. At any rate, the nation as a
whole has acquiesced to them throughout its history, with the exception of the period
of acute political crisis surrounding the Civil War.
274. One of the earliest cases in which the government raised this argument was
Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896), in which the Court held that Congress could not impose a fixed term of incarceration as punishment for illegal presence in the United States without allowing for a judicial trial with full due process
protections. In a scathing "dissent," Justice Field concurred in the judgment but lambasted the "harsh and illegal assertions, made by counsel of the government, on the
argument of this case, as to the right of the court to deny to the accused the full
protection of the law and constitution against every form of oppression and cruelty to
them." Id. at 239.
Ironically, Justice Field had written the majority opinion in The Chinese Exclusion
Case which appeared to put immigration regulation outside the ambit of Court review
in the first place. In reality, since Congress had overruled prior treaty provisions, the
Court had felt that Congress's determination was a kind of "political question" as the
term was then understood, requiring redress by the political branches of the government. 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889). For a brief summary of the modern "political question" doctrine's effect on judicial review of immigration statutes, see supra notes 14355 and accompanying text.
More recently, the government has argued that immigration statutes are completely
outside the scope of judicial review, in Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977). In response,
the Fiallo majority noted that its cases "reflect acceptance of a limited judicial responsibility under the Constitution even with respect to the power of Congress to regulate
the admission and exclusion of aliens," and that such regulations were not inherently
nonjusticiable. 430 U.S. at 793 n.5. The Court noted in passing the "need for special
judicial deference to congressional policy choices in the immigration context" without
giving any particular rationale for this need. Id. at 793.
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own admission if applied to U.S. citizens.275 No invocation of the
"political question" doctrine2 76 or prudential restraint in matters of
foreign affairs2 77 can rationalize the drive to lawless government

and agency action 278 that the Supreme Court has engendered by its
abstentionist refusal to reconsider its earlier immigration holdings.
Conclusion
The latest round of Draconian immigration and crime control
legislation is reimposing the legal conditions of the last century

upon aliens and threatening the promise of "equal justice under
law" for all of us. The Supreme Court must reevaluate the constitutionally aberrant immigration plenary power doctrine that
spawns such laws at its earliest opportunity. The Court's own mandate, as expressed in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,2 7 9 requires no less of it. Otherwise, the worse
275. See supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 143-55 and accompanying text (describing "political question"
doctrine).
277. See supra notes 149-55 and accompanying text.
278. Consider the following excerpt from McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498
U.S. 479, 491 (1991), on application of a law providing for permanent residence for
certain alien agricultural workers: "Nor... is there any dispute that the INS routinely
and persistently violated the Constitution and statutes in processing SAW applications. Petitioners do not deny that those violations caused injury in fact to the two
organizational plaintiffs as well as to the individual members of the plaintiff class."
The Court noted that petitioner's (the government's) arguments assumed there would
have been federal question jurisdiction if Congress had not supposedly eliminated it
by the wording of § 210(e) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, a contention that
the Court rejected. Id. at 491-92. In other words, the government acted as it did
because it felt it could get away with it. Cf. DAVID P. CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS 18
(4th ed. 1990) on the "political question" doctrine: "Except where the [political]
designation reflects a decision that the Constitution commits the matter to discretion,
to characterize an issue as political means that the executive or the legislature may
violate the Constitution and get away with it."
Notably, Congress has once again attempted to strip the courts of jurisdiction over
lawsuits against INS "discretionary determinations," which would have included the
adjudication of the applications at issue in McNary. See supra note 16 (describing
"court-stripping" provisions of Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996). Perhaps the Supreme Court will be forced to rule once and for all
upon whether Congress's lawmaking authority or the Constitution's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clauses have the upper hand in the American legal
system.
279. 505 U.S. 833, 901 (1992) ("Our Constitution is a covenant running from the
first generation of Americans to us and then to future generations. It is a coherent
succession. Each generation must learn anew that the Constitution's written terms
embody ideas and aspirations that must survive more ages than one. We accept our
responsibility not to retreat from interpreting the full meaning of the covenant in light
of all of our precedents. We invoke it once again to define the freedom guaranteed by
the Constitution's own promise, the promise of liberty.").
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"manner of law '281 that America "dooms" on the stranger today
will be its own "doom ' 28 1 tomorrow.

280. See supra text accompanying note 1.
281. See supra text accompanying note 2.

